Competitive economy as a ranking device over networks

Du, Ye; Lehrer, Ehud; Pauzner, Ady

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2015.03.006

Cited by 16 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…It is not homogeneous; its behavior with respect to the multiplication of items' valuations is illustrated in Section 3.3. In the network setting, Du et al (2012) propose methods that turn out to generalize the invariant method. An exchange economy is associated to each network and the resulting equilibrium prices of the nodes are defined as their scores.…”

Section: Examples: the Invariant And Hits Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the peers context, the invariant method is characterized by several axiomatizations (Palacios-Huerta and Volij 2004, Slutzki and Volij 2006, and Altman and Tennenholtz 2005 for its ordinal version). Du et al (2012) propose a "market" approach to rank Web pages and obtain a family of methods that appear as variants of the invariant method. In a different context, Woeginger (2008) provides an axiomatization of the h index, a much used method for ranking researchers.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A ranking method based on handicaps

Demange

2014

Theoretical Economics

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International audienceRanking methods are fundamental tools in many areas. Popular methods aggregate the statements of “experts” in different ways. As such, there are various reasonable ranking methods, each one of them more or less adapted to the environment under consideration. This paper introduces a new method, called the handicap-based method, and characterizes it through appealing properties. This method assigns not only scores to the items, but also weights to the experts. Scores and weights form an equilibrium for a relationship based on the notion of handicaps. The method is, in a sense made precise in the paper, the counterpart to the counting method in environments that require intensity invariance. Intensity invariance is a desirable property when the intensity of the experts' statements has to be controlled. Otherwise, both the counting and the handicap-based methods satisfy a property called homogeneity, which is a desirable property when cardinal statements matter, as is the case in many applications

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Section: Examples: the Invariant And Hits Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A ranking method based on handicaps

Demange

2014

Theoretical Economics

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“…In a similar vein, Du, Lehrer, and Pauzner () use equilibrium prices in a competitive economy to rank items in a (citation) network.…”

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confidence: 99%

Communication networks, externalities, and the price of information

Polanski

2019

The RAND J of Economics

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Information goods (or information for short) play an essential role in modern economies. We consider a setup where information has some idiosyncratic value for each consumer, exerts externalities, and can be freely replicated and transmitted in a communication network. Prices paid for information are determined via the (asymmetric) Nash Bargaining Solution with endogenous disagreement points. This decentralized approach leads to unique prices and payoffs in any exogenous network. We use these payoffs to find connection structures that emerge under different externality regimes in pre‐trade network formation stage. An application to citation graphs results in eigenvector‐like measures of intellectual influence.

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“…An illustration of a directed citation graph is provided inFigure 2. 11 In a similar vein,Du, Lehrer, and Pauzner (2015) use equilibrium prices in a competitive economy to rank items in a (citation) network. C The RAND Corporation 2019.…”

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confidence: 99%

Communication Networks, Externalities and the Price of Information

Polanski

2018

SSRN Journal

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Information goods (or information for short) play an essential role in modern economies. We consider a setup where information has some idiosyncratic value for each consumer, exerts externalities, and can be freely replicated and transmitted in a communication network. Prices paid for information are determined via the (asymmetric) Nash Bargaining Solution with endogenous disagreement points. This decentralized approach leads to unique prices and payoffs in any exogenous network. We use these payoffs to find connection structures that emerge under different externality regimes in pre-trade network formation stage. An application to citation graphs results in eigenvector-like measures of intellectual influence. * University of East Anglia; A.Polanski@uea.ac.uk.

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Competitive economy as a ranking device over networks

Cited by 16 publications

References 9 publications

A ranking method based on handicaps

A ranking method based on handicaps

Communication networks, externalities, and the price of information

Communication Networks, Externalities and the Price of Information

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