Competitive equilibria and the grand coalition

Welfare Analysis of a Market Model with External Increasing Returns and Differentiated Commodities

“…Therefore one might say that the latter should also be a continuum. We answer this conceptual question by noticing that our model can include a continuum of consumers, following the well known idea (e.g., [24]). Let [ ] 0,1 I = be the set of consumers which is the unit interval.…”

Robust efficiency in mixed economies with asymmetric information

“…Proof. Suppose that f is a Walrasian expectations allocation of E. Applying an argument similar to that in [17], one can show that it is robustly efficient.…”

“…Concerning a complete information economy, Hervés-Beloso and Mareno-García [17] provided a characterization of Walrasian allocations by robustly efficient allocations when the economy has a continuum of agents and finitely many commodities. More precisely, if f is a Walrasian allocation then it is non-dominated in not only the initial economy but also all economies obtained by modifying the initial endowments of any coalition in the direction of f .…”

Blocking efficiency in an economy with asymmetric information

“…Note that in the literature, some authors used a slightly weaker assumption:  a(·, ω)dµ ≫ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, for instance, Angeloni and Martins-da-Rocha (2009) and Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García (2008). For any n ≥ 1, the (n − 1)-simplex of R n is defined as…”

“…As indicated in Evren and Hüsseinov (2008), this lemma also holds for the privately measurable allocations and is closely related to Theorem 9 of Cornwall (1972), whose finite dimensional version was proved in Grodal (1971). Note that Grodal's result has been used in the proofs of the main results of Hervés-Beloso and Moreno-García (2008), andVind (1972). S (a(·, ω) − g(·, ω))dµ ≫ 0 for all ω ∈ Ω, (ii) g(t, ·) is  P S -measurable and V t (g(t, ·)) > V t (f (t, ·)) for almost all t ∈ S.…”