2008
DOI: 10.1002/nav.20316
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Competitive location and capacity decisions for firms serving time‐sensitive customers

Abstract: In this paper we explore how two competing firms locate and set capacities to serve timesensitive customers. Because customers are time-sensitive, they may decline to place an order from either competitor if their expected waiting time is large. We develop a two-stage game where firms set capacities and then locations, and show that three types of subgame perfect equilibria are possible: local monopoly (in which each customer is served by a single firm, but some customers may be left unserved), constrained loc… Show more

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Cited by 21 publications
(8 citation statements)
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References 29 publications
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“…There is only one study in this category accomplished by Kwasnica and Stavrulaki (2008), which explored how two firms locate and set capacities to serve time-sensitive customers. Because customers are time-sensitive, they may decline to place an order from either competitor if their expected waiting time is large.…”
Section: Location-other Variables Models In Competition With Foresighmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…There is only one study in this category accomplished by Kwasnica and Stavrulaki (2008), which explored how two firms locate and set capacities to serve time-sensitive customers. Because customers are time-sensitive, they may decline to place an order from either competitor if their expected waiting time is large.…”
Section: Location-other Variables Models In Competition With Foresighmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Our article complements the extensive literature that investigates competitive equilibrium in a market with demand uncertainty (e.g., [19,20,38]). One common feature in this literature stream is that demand uncertainty is captured by consumer's location/taste and incorporated with a Hotelling line segment (e.g., [6,12,23]). Therefore, two competing sellers who produce identical products must make their location and then their price decisions.…”
Section: Related Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Researchers have recently investigated the interactions among various subsets of the (price, location, capacity) space. In a competitive environment, for example, a group of papers hold the price fixed while varying capacity (e.g., [20,15,23]), a second group of papers hold capacity fixed and vary price (e.g., [27,25,34]), while a third group of papers examines simultaneous, or sequential, pricing and capacity decisions (e.g., [33,28,9,10]). With the exception of [23], these papers focus on the equilibrium solutions of competing firms, but they do not incorporate the notion of distance and server location in their models.…”
Section: Literature Reviewmentioning
confidence: 99%