Competitive representative negotiations worsen intergroup relations

Abstract

Representative negotiation affords a unique opportunity to regulate intergroup competition and conflict. Although past research has identified factors that shape representative negotiations, little is known about how such interpersonal representative negotiations influence broader intergroup relations. Here we investigate how the representative negotiation process can affect intergroup relations, irrespective of negotiation outcomes. In Experiment 1, competitive (as opposed to cooperative or neutral) communication by the outgroup representative decreased satisfaction with the outcome and increased outgroup derogation. In Experiment 2, the timing of the competitive behavior of the outgroup representative was shown to affect ensuing intergroup relations, such that early rather than late competition led to higher outcome satisfaction because of reduced outcome expectations, but also decreased trust in and perceived closeness of the outgroup. Together, these findings show that competitive behavior, especially early rather than late in the representative negotiation process increases outcome satisfaction, but hurts intergroup relations, regardless of the actual negotiation outcome.

How representatives with a dovish constituency reach higher individual and joint outcomes in integrative negotiations

“…The contribution of this experiment is threefold. First, we expand the burgeoning literature on representative negotiations, specifically filling the gap where research has mostly investigated single issue and/or simulated negotiations (Aaldering, Greer, van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2013; Saygi et al, 2014; Steinel et al, 2009; Steinel et al, 2010; van Kleef et al, 2007). Our research shows how representatives interact to reach joint agreement depending on the preferences of their constituency.…”

“…Self-reported satisfaction (adapted from Saygı, Greer, van Kleef, & De Dreu, 2014) with the agreement was measured with six items (“I am satisfied with the agreement,” “I think I made a good deal,” “I think a better result would have been possible” [reverse coded], “I am annoyed that the agreement is not better” [reverse coded], “I am happy with the agreement,” and “I am disappointed about the agreement” [reverse coded]). Answering ranged from 1 ( not at all ) to 7 ( very much ), Cronbach’s α = .93.…”

Bounded Benefits of Representative Cooperativeness in Intergroup Negotiations

“…Previous research has shown that positive contact with an individual outgroup member can generalize to the entire outgroup (e.g., Johnston and Hewstone 1992;Saygi et al 2014;Weber and Crocker 1983), and this effect has been found even in the absence of direct contact (e.g., Turner et al 2007). However, this generalization process is most likely when group membership is made salient (Vivian et al 1997), such as by the prototypicality of the outgroup members (Oakes and Turner 1986;Oakes et al 1991).…”

“…Representative negotiation involves a two-level situation, in which the negotiation among individual representatives is embedded in a broader intergroup context, and the broader intergroup relations in turn depend on the way representatives negotiate (e.g., Knowles and Bassett 1976;Lickel et al 2000;Saygi et al 2014). Especially the second component, or the degree to which representatives' behaviors impact broader intergroup relations, is poorly understood .…”

“…Indeed, in a first study of the effects of representative behavior on intergroup relations, Saygi et al (2014) found that cooperative tendencies by the outgroup representative promoted positive perceptions of, and behavioral tendencies towards, the outgroup as a whole. From this it follows that when the outgroup representative is perceived as cooperative (rather than non-cooperative), ingroup members should engage in more constructive behavioral tendencies towards outgroup members, such as helping, protecting, and associating with the outgroup (e.g., Cuddy et al 2008;Fiske et al 1999Fiske et al , 2002.…”