Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors

Cleemput, Jeroen Van; Coppens, Bart; Sutter, Bjorn De

doi:10.1145/2086696.2086702

Cited by 52 publications

(39 citation statements)

References 37 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Bayrak et al [4] proposed a framework to automate the application of power analysis countermeasures, which forms the basis of this work. Cleemput et al [10] proposed compiler techniques to defend against timing attacks on x86 processors.…”

Section: Automation In Side-channel Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures

Bayrak

Regazzoni

Novo

et al. 2015

IEEE Trans. Comput.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-We introduce a compiler that automatically inserts software countermeasures to protect cryptographic algorithms against power-based side-channel attacks. The compiler first estimates which instruction instances leak the most information through sidechannels. This information is obtained either by dynamic analysis, evaluating an information theoretic metric over the power traces acquired during the execution of the input program, or by static analysis. As information leakage implies a loss of security, the compiler then identifies (groups of) instruction instances to protect with a software countermeasure such as random precharging or Boolean masking. As software protection incurs significant overhead in terms of cryptosystem runtime and memory usage, the compiler protects the minimum number of instruction instances to achieve a desired level of security. The compiler is evaluated on two block ciphers, AES and Clefia; our experiments demonstrate that the compiler can automatically identify and protect the most important instruction instances. To date, these software countermeasures have been inserted manually by security experts, who are not necessarily the main cryptosystem developers. Our compiler offers significant productivity gains for cryptosystem developers who wish to protect their implementations from side-channel attacks.

show abstract

Section: Automation In Side-channel Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures

Bayrak

Regazzoni

Novo

et al. 2015

IEEE Trans. Comput.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We therefore focus on purely software solutions, aiming at optimizing their efficiency to fit the performance constraints while avoiding the need for expensive specialized hardware. The need to take into account security and trust as an embedded system design objective, together with the growing complexity of the target devices, has spurred a trend toward automating both vulnerability detection [11], [12] and application of SCA countermeasures [13], [14] making use of compiler concepts and electronic design automation tools.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The MEET Approach: Securing Cryptographic Embedded Software Against Side Channel Attacks

Agosta

Barenghi

Pelosi

et al. 2015

IEEE Trans. Comput.-Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We propose an efficient and effective methods to secure software implementations of cryptographic primitives on low-end embedded systems, against passive side channel attacks relying on the observation of power consumption or electro-magnetic emissions. The proposed approach exploits a modified LLVM compiler toolchain to automatically generate a secure binary characterized by a randomized execution flow. We improve the current state-of-the-art in dynamic executable code countermeasures removing the requirement of a writable code segment, and reducing the countermeasure overhead. Also, we provide a new method to refresh the random values employed in the share splitting approaches to lookup table protection. Finally, we devise an automated approach to protect spill actions onto the main memory, which are inserted by the compiler backend register allocator when there is a lack of available registers, thus, removing the need for manual assembly inspection. We report a validation of the performances of our approach on all the current ISO-standard block ciphers, employing an ARM Cortex-M4 based microcontroller as the validation platform.

show abstract

“…Recently, the need to take into account security and trust as an embedded system design objective has spurred a trend towards automating both vulnerability detection [1,5] and application of hardware and software countermeasures [2,8] making use of compiler concepts and Electronic Design Automation (EDA) tools. Our approach employs a compile-time code transformation, performed by an automated pass implemented in the LLVM compiler framework [15], to produce an executable code that is able to change its power profile at runtime.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Multiple Equivalent Execution Trace Approach to Secure Cryptographic Embedded Software

Agosta

Barenghi

Pelosi

et al. 2014

Proceedings of the 51st Annual Design Automation Conference

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We propose an efficient and effective method to secure software implementations of cryptographic primitives on low-end embedded systems, against passive side-channel attacks relying on the observation of power consumption or electro-magnetic emissions. The proposed approach exploits a modified LLVM compiler toolchain to automatically generate a secure binary characterized by a randomized execution flow. Also, we provide a new method to refresh the random values employed in the share splitting approaches to lookup table protection, addressing a currently open issue. We improve the current state-of-the-art in dynamic executable code countermeasures removing the requirement of a writeable code segment, and reducing the countermeasure overhead.

show abstract

Compiler mitigations for time attacks on modern x86 processors

Cited by 52 publications

References 37 publications

Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures

Automatic Application of Power Analysis Countermeasures

The MEET Approach: Securing Cryptographic Embedded Software Against Side Channel Attacks

A Multiple Equivalent Execution Trace Approach to Secure Cryptographic Embedded Software

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About