Complementarities and Games: New Developments

Vives, Xavier

doi:10.1257/0022051054661558

Cited by 280 publications

(170 citation statements)

References 67 publications

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“…The shaded area in the top chart of Panel II in Figure 1 shows where the decisions of the private sector and of the policy maker are complementary whilst in the unshaded area the decisions Söderlind (1999) are substitutable. Because of complementarities between the decisions of agents now multiple equilibria can arise, see Cooper and John (1988), Vives (2005).…”

Section: Discretionary Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria in LQ RE Models

Blake

Kirsanova

2011

SSRN Journal

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We study discretionary equilibria in dynamic linear-quadratic rational expectations models. In contrast to the assumptions that pervade this literature we show that these models do have multiple equilibria in some situations. We demonstrate the existence of multiple discretionary equilibria by example. We investigate general properties of discretionary equilibria and discuss implications for numerical algorithms.

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Section: Discretionary Equilibriamentioning

confidence: 99%

Discretionary Policy and Multiple Equilibria in LQ RE Models

Blake

Kirsanova

2011

SSRN Journal

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“…We now introduce two additional properties that are crucial for robust stochastic stability, supermodularity and strategic complementarity (Topkis, 1998;Vives, 2005).…”

Section: Notation and Definitionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Robust stochastic stability

Alós–Ferrer

Netzer

2014

Econ Theory

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in EconStor may Revised Version January 2014Abstract A strategy profile of a game is called robustly stochastically stable if it is stochastically stable for a given behavioral model independently of the specification of revision opportunities and tie-breaking assumptions in the dynamics. We provide a simple radius-coradius result for robust stochastic stability and examine several applications. For the logit-response dynamics, the selection of potential maximizers is robust for the subclass of supermodular symmetric binary-action games. For the mistakes model, the weaker property of strategic complementarity suffices for robustness in this class of games. We also investigate the robustness of the selection of risk-dominant strategies in coordination games under best-reply and the selection of Walrasian strategies in aggregative games under imitation.

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“…Notice that the following definition is similar to GSCà la Nash (see [11]), 3 but is essentially different since corresponding best response correspondences are different. Definition 3.1.…”

Section: Definition 23mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In the literature (see [11,12] among others), sufficient conditions for games to be GSCà la Nash are provided: For each i ∈ N , if the utility function u i is supermodular in own strategies x i and has increasing differences in (x i , x −i ), then the conditions on the best response correspondences are satisfied. As a matter of fact, since utility functions are already defined within the game form, providing sufficient conditions on utility functions are considered to be more convenient.…”

Section: Theorem 33mentioning

confidence: 99%