Complementarities in automobile production

Biesebroeck, Johannes Van

doi:10.1002/jae.995

Cited by 39 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…Essentially, we need instrumental variables for at least one of the practices (e.g. Van Biesebroeck, 2007), but this is hard to obtain as it is unclear what such an instrument would be -how could it be legitimately excluded from the second stage equation? In classical factor demand analysis we would examine the cross price effects to gauge the existence of Hicks-Allen complements versus substitutes, i.e.…”

Section: Complementaritiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Resource Management and Productivity

Bloom¹,

Reenen

2010

183

158

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In this chapter we examine the relationship between Human Resource Management (HRM) and productivity. HRM includes incentive pay (individual and group) as well as many nonpay aspects of the employment relationship such as matching (hiring and firing) and work organization (e.g. teams, autonomy). We place HRM more generally within the literature on management practices and productivity. We start with some facts on levels and trends of both HRM and productivity and the main economic theories of HRM. We look at some of the determinants of HRM -risk, competition, ownership and regulation. The largest section analyses the impact of HRM on productivity emphasizing issues of methodology, data and results (from micro-econometric studies). We conclude briefly with suggestions of avenues for future frontier work.

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Section: Complementaritiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Human Resource Management and Productivity

Bloom¹,

Reenen

2010

183

158

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“…Additionally, our results above might still be subject to reverse causation. In order to explicitly account for potential endogeneity of mobile ICT in the production function, we perform an instrumental variable regression (IV) (Athey and Stern, 1998;Biesebroeck, 2007). In general, finding instrumental variables, which affect the firms' output only through the potentially endogenous ICT input, is challenging.…”

Section: Instrumental Variable Estimationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust-Based Work Time and the Productivity Effects of Mobile Information Technologies in the Workplace

Viete

Erdsiek

2018

SSRN Journal

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Die Dis cus si on Pape rs die nen einer mög lichst schnel len Ver brei tung von neue ren For schungs arbei ten des ZEW. Die Bei trä ge lie gen in allei ni ger Ver ant wor tung der Auto ren und stel len nicht not wen di ger wei se die Mei nung des ZEW dar.Dis cus si on Papers are inten ded to make results of ZEW research prompt ly avai la ble to other eco no mists in order to encou ra ge dis cus si on and sug gesti ons for revi si ons. The aut hors are sole ly respon si ble for the con tents which do not neces sa ri ly repre sent the opi ni on of the ZEW. Trust-Based Work Time and the Productivity Effects of Mobile Information Technologies in the WorkplaceSteffen Viete * and Daniel Erdsiek ‡ March 2018 AbstractWe investigate whether the returns to mobile information and communication technology (ICT) in the workplace are contingent on granting employees autonomy over the structure of their workday through trust-based work time arrangements (TBW). Our regression analysis is based on a production function framework and exploits fine-grained firm survey data on ICT use and organisational practices for 1,045 service firms in Germany. We find empirical support for the argument that the returns to mobile ICT are higher when TBW allows for discretion over when, where and how to perform work-related tasks. The finding holds when we account for more limited forms of workplace flexibility, suggesting that the high degree of formal employee autonomy under TBW drives the complementarity between mobile ICT and organisational practices. JEL-Classification: D22, L22, M10, O33.

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“…We need an instrumental variable for one of the practices (e.g. Van Biesebroeck, 2007), but this is hard to obtain as it is unclear what such an instrument would be, i.e. could it be legitimately excluded from the second stage equation?…”

Section: Complementarities Between Organizational Practicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms

Aghion¹,

Bloom²

2013

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We survey the theoretical and empirical literature on decentralization within firms. We first discuss how the concept of incomplete contracts shapes our views about the organization of decision-making within firms. We then overview the empirical evidence on the determinants of decentralization and on the effects of decentralization on firm performance. A number of factors highlighted in the theory are shown to be important in accounting for delegation, such as heterogeneity and congruence of preferences as proxied by trust. Empirically, competition, human capital and IT also appear to foster decentralization. There are substantial gaps between theoretical and empirical work and we suggest avenues for future research in bridging this gap.

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Complementarities in automobile production

Cited by 39 publications

References 22 publications

Human Resource Management and Productivity

Human Resource Management and Productivity

Trust-Based Work Time and the Productivity Effects of Mobile Information Technologies in the Workplace

Incomplete Contracts and the Internal Organization of Firms

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