Complexity of control by partitioning veto elections and of control by adding candidates to plurality elections

Maushagen, Cynthia; Rothe, Jörg

doi:10.1007/s10472-017-9565-7

Cited by 9 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 29 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This construction of E(i, j) and E(j, i) is due to Maushagen and Rothe (2016). We thank them for pointing out the flaw in our original construction and repairing it (we explain why the current construction works within the proofs).…”

Section: For Each Fixed Integer T ≥ 2 and For Each Voting Rulementioning

confidence: 96%

“…Finally, we mention that the original construction in our multi-colored clique proofs had a very subtle bug that was noted and fixed by Maushagen and Rothe (2016); we incorporate the fix here.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In this version, in addition to providing all proofs, we fixed a flaw in our multi-colored clique proof technique. The flaw was pointed out and fixed by Maushagen and Rothe (2016 Proof. We use almost the same proof as in Theorem 4.3, but we add sufficiently many dummy (padding) candidates to ensure that we can only delete vertex and edge candidates.…”

Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy

Faliszewski¹,

Niedermeier²,

Talmon³

2017

jair

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study the computational complexity of candidate control in elections with few voters, that is, we consider the parameterized complexity of candidate control in elections with respect to the number of voters as a parameter. We consider both the standard scenario of adding and deleting candidates, where one asks whether a given candidate can become a winner (or, in the destructive case, can be precluded from winning) by adding or deleting few candidates, as well as a combinatorial scenario where adding/deleting a candidate automatically means adding or deleting a whole group of candidates. Considering several fundamental voting rules, our results show that the parameterized complexity of candidate control, with the number of voters as the parameter, is much more varied than in the setting with many voters.

show abstract

Section: For Each Fixed Integer T ≥ 2 and For Each Voting Rulementioning

confidence: 96%

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Acknowledgmentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Elections with Few Voters: Candidate Control Can Be Easy

Faliszewski¹,

Niedermeier²,

Talmon³

2017

jair

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…We settle this open problem. • Faliszewski, Hemaspaandra, and Hemaspaandra [23] and Maushagen and Rothe [45,47] investigated the complexity of control in maximin elections but focused on standard control types (i.e., on the cases of constructive and destructive control by adding, deleting, and partitioning either candidates or voters). This leaves the corresponding cases of control by replacing candidates or voters open.…”

Section: Our Main Contributionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As surveyed by Faliszewski and Rothe [25] and Baumeister and Rothe [8], plenty of voting rules have been analyzed in terms of their control complexity since then. In addition to the just mentioned results on plurality, Condorcet, and approval voting (and its variants) [7,9,16,19,33]; the complexity of control in various scenarios has been thoroughly analyzed for Copeland [9,24]; maximin [23,45,47,61]; k-veto and k-approval [39,43,46,62]; Bucklin and fallback voting [16,17,20,22], range voting and normalized range voting [48], and Schulze voting [49,54]. Among these voting rules, fallback voting (a hybrid system due to Brams and Sanver [10] that combines Bucklin with approval voting) and normalized range voting (both will be defined in Sect.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Towards completing the puzzle: complexity of control by replacing, adding, and deleting candidates or voters

Erdélyi

Neveling

Reger

et al. 2021

Auton Agent Multi-Agent Syst

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We investigate the computational complexity of electoral control in elections. Electoral control describes the scenario where the election chair seeks to alter the outcome of the election by structural changes such as adding, deleting, or replacing either candidates or voters. Such control actions have been studied in the literature for a lot of prominent voting rules. We complement those results by solving several open cases for Copeland$$^{\alpha }$$ α , maximin, k-veto, plurality with runoff, veto with runoff, Condorcet, fallback, range voting, and normalized range voting.

show abstract