Compliance Agreements: Emergent Flexibility in the Inter-American Human Rights System

Abstract

Are agreements between states and victims an effective way to achieve reparations for human rights violations? We identify and evaluate a legal instrument hitherto ignored in analyses of the Inter-American Human Rights System: compliance agreements. These agreements emerged as a tool to negotiate the implementation of recommendations made by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to states responsible for human rights violations. In the first part of the paper, we theorize the role of agreements in securing state compliance, and discuss the problem of self-selection in legal settlements. We then document the emergence of this legal instrument and its novel role in the Inter-American System. In the third part, we provide statistical evidence from event history, matching, difference-in-differences, and sensitivity analyses showing that agreements increase the probability of compliance and cut the expected time to compliance by more than half. Agreements thus contribute to a potential solution for the perceived crisis of compliance in the Inter-American Human Rights System. However, the Commission must offer greater transparency to facilitate the evaluation of this mechanism.