Compliance, Collaboration, and Codes of Labor Practice: The ADIDAS Connection

Ethical Sourcing: An Analysis of the Literature and Implications for Future Research

“…Corporate codes of conduct have been regarded as one of the effective tools for managing CSR (Roberts 2003;Preuss 2009); however, there is a critique of its effectiveness (Frenkel 2001;Locke and Romis 2010;Taylor 2011;Knudsen 2013). As stated by Frenkel and Scott (2002), pp. 30-31, ''voluntary codes are restricted to a relatively small number of global firms and they only regulate firsttier exporters in particular sectors in developing countries''.…”

“…This leads us to believe that ethical sourcing codes of conduct alone are insufficient for greater supplier compliance. It should be complemented by collaborative supply chain partnerships (Frenkel and Scott 2002;Locke and Romis 2007). Research into this topic is less explored; thus future research should examine the role of collaboration with suppliers in linking the ethical codes of conduct to its compliance.…”

Exploring the Effects of Union–NGO Relationships on Corporate Responsibility: The Case of the Swedish Clean Clothes Campaign

“…In response to the criticism, TNCs started to extend their responsibility for workers' rights at their suppliers' factories in developing countries (Emmelhainz and Adams, 1999;Kolk and van Tulder, 2002;Sethi, 2002;Radin, 2004). The main actors involved in specifying and defining this extended sense of responsibility were TNCs, NGOs active in promoting workers' rights, and labour/trade unions (e.g., Christmann and Taylor, 2002;Frenkel and Scott, 2002;Sullivan, 2003;Frenkel and Kim, 2004;Prieto and Quinteros, 2004). Hence, these specification and definition processes can be characterised as instances of 'governance without government' , aimed at filling the governance gaps left by governmental retreat from international issues of corporate responsibility (Beck, 1992;Rosenau, 1992;Strange, 1996).…”

Post-Partnership Strategies for Defining Corporate Responsibility: The Business Social Compliance Initiative

“…While NGOs and unions were critical of the proposed monitoring system because of its perceived questionable 'independence' , they were also critical of the fact it was based on announced and official interviews. As noted in previous research into codes of conduct (O' Rourke, 1997; Doig and Wilson, 1998;Frenkel and Scott, 2002;Graafland, 2002;Healy and Iles, 2002;O' Rourke, 2002;Winstanley et al, 2002;Hemphill, 2004), the interviewees were concerned that such monitoring practices were incapable of identifying breaches to a code of conduct, since suppliers can deceive auditors using announced and official interviews. In comparison, BSCI members and the interviewed non-BSCI corporations were more optimistic concerning these monitoring methods, while still recognising the potential for deception.…”