Compliance, conversion and the Asch paradigm

Mugny, Gabriel

doi:10.1002/ejsp.2420140402

Cited by 22 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 21 publications

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“…In two decades of research, Mugny repeatedly demonstrated that while minority influence on focal change may be negligible, it may be significant and positive on related issues (Mugny, 1975;Mugny, 1982;Mugny & PCrez, 1991). Lack of focal change paired to substantial related influence occurs all the more when arguments are presented in a rigid rather than flexible manner (e.g., Mugny, 1982;, when the validity of the minority arguments is explicitly denied (Clark, 1990;Moscovici, 1987;Moscovici, Mugny & PCrez, 1986;Mugny, 1984Mugny, ,1985, when the arguments are consistent rather than inconsistent over time (Moscovici, 1980), or when the minority arguments intensify a value conflict (SanchezMazas, 1996) (for an extensive meta-analysis, see Wood et al, 1994).…”

Section: Minority Influencementioning

confidence: 98%

Majority and Minority Influence: A Dual Role Interpretation

Vries

Dreu

Gordijn

et al. 1996

European Review of Social Psychology

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Section: Minority Influencementioning

confidence: 98%

Majority and Minority Influence: A Dual Role Interpretation

Vries

Dreu

Gordijn

et al. 1996

European Review of Social Psychology

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“…Even Moscovici's colleagues and those working in his laboratory rarely recognize the revolutionary theoretical nature of his ideas. For example, Gabriel Mugny, who has made significant contributions to the studies of minorities, points out: “This pattern of influence appears to be the exact opposite of the compliance effects found in the Asch (1951, 1956) paradigm” (Mugny, 1984, p. 354). Despite their valuable empirical contributions, such authors formulate their claims in ways that suggest that all there is to the minority/majority influence, is a different—or an additional—kind of experimental manipulation rather than a new underlying epistemology of social psychology (see below).…”

Section: Revolutions and Discoveries In Sciencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Epistemological Significance of the Theory of Social Representations

Marková

2008

J Theory Soc Behav

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The theory of social representations must be understood in terms of its proper epistemology so that it can accomplish its full potential in social sciences. This is often difficult to achieve because researchers comprehend it in terms of concepts that are part of static and individualistic Newtonian epistemology rather than in terms of dynamic and relational Einsteinian epistemology. This article considers three signposts that Moscovici identifies and analyses in the theory of relativity, namely the relation between epistemology and science, theory and method, and the argument against the explanation of effects by their causes. The following question is posed: are these signposts also characteristic of the theory of social representations? This question is examined focusing on interactional epistemology, theory and method and the diversity of natural thinking and communication. Moscovici's Psychoanalysis shows that natural thinking appears in a plurality of modes according to the situation in which it takes place and according to social groups towards which it is directed. Natural thinking is controversial and communication-centred. Different professionals, groups and lay people use different kinds of speaking and different communicative genres when they try to resolve "the same" problem. The article suggests that bringing together dialogicality, dialogical linguistics and the theory of social representations may open up new possibilities for theoretical developments in social psychology. Key words: theory of social representations; interactional epistemology; Einstein's triangle of relations; natural thinking; dialogicality, dialogical linguistics During my dialogues with Serge Moscovici some years ago I posed him a question concerning the relation between the theory of social representations and the minority/majority innovation. He insisted that these two theories were separate from one another and that they had different aims, purposes and concepts. Nevertheless, it was my view that these two theories shared philosophical and epistemological presuppositions on which they were built. Serge Moscovici has worked on these theories more or less simultaneously, although during certain periods he has devoted more intellectual effort to one rather than to the other. So I insisted: "These two theories have the same philosophical basis." "Maybe" he responded, "I do not think that I am split into two different persons, so they probably share something, but they are independent theories." Serge Moscovici has been always concerned with the theoretical and epistemological basis of social psychology as well as with that of his own work, and he has written extensively about these issues. Of course, such complex questions can be approached from diverse perspectives depending on the problem under study. For example, in considering the relation between social influence and cognition, in order to make his point, he has chosen to contrast epistemologies of minorities and majorities (Moscovici, 1993). On the other hand, t...

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“…The distinction we wish to make is captured by the terms compliance and conversion (MacDonald, Nail, & Levy, 2004;Mugny, 1984;Nail, MacDonald, & Levy, 2000). When confronted with a message that conflicts with their own beliefs, children (and adults) may behave in a manner consistent with the message for social reasons (i.e., compliance) rather than because their beliefs have actually changed (i.e., conversion).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compliance, conversion, and category induction

Jaswal

Lima

Small

2009

Journal of Experimental Child Psychology

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When children hear an object referred to with a label that is moderately discrepant from its appearance, they frequently make inferences about that object consistent with the label rather than its appearance. We asked whether 3-year-olds actually believe these unexpected labels (i.e., conversion) or whether their inferences simply reflect a desire to comply with the considerable experimental demands of the induction task (i.e., compliance). Specifically, we asked how likely children would be to pass an unexpected label on to another person who had not been present during the labeling event. Results showed that children who used an unexpected label as the basis for inference passed that label on to another person about as often as they could remember it. This suggests that children's label-based inferences do reflect conversion rather than mere compliance.

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Compliance, conversion and the Asch paradigm

Cited by 22 publications

References 21 publications

Majority and Minority Influence: A Dual Role Interpretation

Majority and Minority Influence: A Dual Role Interpretation

The Epistemological Significance of the Theory of Social Representations

Compliance, conversion, and category induction

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