Compliance, corruption and co-management: how corruption fuels illegalities and undermines the legitimacy of fisheries co-management

Abstract

Links between corruption and illegal practices within fisheries are recognised in existing literature but little reference has been made to how these interconnected practices affect the performance and legitimacy of fisheries comanagement. Research in the three countries bordering Lake Victoria, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda, found that corruption is systemic and that members of all stakeholder groups-fishers, fisheries officers, police and the judiciary-are implicated. It was confirmed that corruption is strongly linked to illegalities and that corruption in this context should be viewed as a collective action problem, with fishers reluctant to invest in legal gears and methods when they perceive illegalities and corruption to be prevalent. It was also found that corrupt practices linked to illegalities discourages local level fisheries management structuresthe Beach Management Units-from enforcing regulations and contributes to a lack of trust between fishers and government. Linked corruption and illegal fisheries practices were therefore found to be undermining the performance and legitimacy of co-management. This article concludes that whilst co-management offers opportunities for collusive corruption through collaborative arrangements, any management system will be susceptible to the harmful effects of corruption where it is systemic and is not formally recognised or appropriately addressed. Greater official recognition of the links between corruption and illegalities, and a range of appropriate actions taken to this collective action problem, is essential if co-management is to have a chance of success.

Corruption and Anti-Corruption in Environmental and Resource Management

“…Widespread corruption has also been documented in the enforcement of regulations of the comanaged fishery of Lake Victoria, which spans Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (83). The interviewed boat owners allege that leaders of Beach Management Units (the co-management organizations), fisheries staff, policemen, and the judiciary take bribes in return for lenient or no enforcement in relation to many aspects of the fishery, including allowing illegal fishing to take place and to return gear that had been seized (83). Those findings are similar to those of other research focused on the Kenyan part of the same fishery (84).…”

Outcomes of participatory fisheries management: An example from co-management in Zambia's Mweru-Luapula fishery

“…Therefore in the African region, countries such as Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Nigeria, Benin, South Africa, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia have adopted co-management to manage fisheries ( Sverdrup-Jensen and Nielsen, 1998 ; Kosamu, 2015 ). Its adoption is attributed to the desire to improve fisher compliance to fisheries regulations by involving fishers in decision-making ( Kosamu, 2015 ; Nunan et al, 2018 ); the need to resolve conflicts among artisanal fishers; reverse the depletion of fish stock; lack of monetary resources to finance centralized command and control regimes; inadequate government personnel, and pressure from international organizations and international treaties ( Haambiya et al, 2015a ; d’ Armengol et al, 2018 ; Vlachopoulou, 2014 ).…”

“…For one, the lack of appropriate policies and legal frameworks to support local-based institutions such as Fishing Associations to strengthen their legitimacy and finance their activities undermines their role in the co-management system ( Chabwela and Haller, 2010 ). Local-based organizations which often operate on voluntary basis are incentivized to receive bribes from fishers at the expense of imposing sanctions, thereby sustaining illegal and destructive fishing activities ( Banda et al, 2015 ; Nunan et al, 2018 ). Weakly supported local organizations are unable to represent the views of resource-users and also prevent the state from delegating authority and responsibilities to resource users ( Haambiya et al 2015a ).…”

“…boat owners, women, youth, elders etc.) with government officials ( Onyango, 2014 ; Nunan et al, 2018 ). However, high usage of illegal mesh size nets, limited enforcement capacity by regulatory agencies and high incidence of corruption in public service remain rampant in the region ( Etiegni et al, 2016 ; Nunan et al, 2018 ).…”

“…with government officials ( Onyango, 2014 ; Nunan et al, 2018 ). However, high usage of illegal mesh size nets, limited enforcement capacity by regulatory agencies and high incidence of corruption in public service remain rampant in the region ( Etiegni et al, 2016 ; Nunan et al, 2018 ). In the Southern region, co-management studies in Mozambique's Kwirikwidge province showed reduced conflicts between small-scale and industrial fishing fleets, reduced use of destructive (mosquito) nets, increased awareness of conservation measures and financial support to fishers ( Lopes and Gervasio, 1999 ; Benkenstein, 2013 ) while Malawi's co-management system on Lake Chiuta successfully banned destructive seine net fishing activities through local Beach Village Committees and enforced formal and locally developed rules.…”