2012
DOI: 10.1007/s11098-012-9927-2
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Complicitous liability in war

Abstract: Jeff McMahan has argued against the moral equivalence of combatants (MEC) by developing a liability-based account of killing in warfare. On this account, a combatant is morally liable to be killed only if doing so is an effective means of reducing or eliminating an unjust threat to which that combatant is contributing. Since combatants fighting for a just cause generally do not contribute to unjust threats, they are not morally liable to be killed; thus MEC is mistaken. The problem, however, is that many unjus… Show more

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Cited by 23 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…As before, we can advance nonreductivist arguments for revisionist conclusions (Bazargan 2013) and reductivist arguments for traditionalism (Steinhoff 2008, Lazar 2015. But the predominant dialectic has been the other way.…”
Section: The Methodology Of Just War Theorymentioning
confidence: 86%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…As before, we can advance nonreductivist arguments for revisionist conclusions (Bazargan 2013) and reductivist arguments for traditionalism (Steinhoff 2008, Lazar 2015. But the predominant dialectic has been the other way.…”
Section: The Methodology Of Just War Theorymentioning
confidence: 86%
“…Many philosophers then sought to defend traditionalism by rejecting either descriptive (Kutz 2005, Walzer 2006b[1977, Lazar 2012b) or evaluative individualism (Zohar 1993). Again, of course some individualists defend traditionalism (Emerton & Handfield 2009), and some collectivists are revisionists (Bazargan 2013).…”
Section: The Methodology Of Just War Theorymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…For example, citizens may be culpable for being complicit in the state's wrongs, despite not contributing (much) to those wrongs (Beerbohm, ; Pasternak, ). Or perhaps some citizens are complicit, while others are not (e.g., Bazargan, argues that soldiers, in particular, are culpable for their state's unjust wars via complicity).…”
Section: Are Citizens Responsible For What Their States Do?mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Some have employed the idea of complicity to think about, for instance, the responsibility of soldiers for the harms caused by their state's military. 12 Others have used the concept to generate a weak membership condition for collective agency, and thereby joint responsibility for collectives' acts. 13 To diagnose unethical consumption in terms of complicity, we would take the principal offenders to be the corporations who run sweatshops, who purchase conflict minerals, who pay unfair prices for coffee and chocolate beans, and so on.…”
Section: Five Promising Approachesmentioning
confidence: 99%