Composable and Finite Computational Security of Quantum Message Transmission

Banfi, Fabio; Maurer, Ueli; Portmann, Christopher; Zhu, Jiamin

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-36030-6_12

Cited by 3 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…VIII.F.1 we explain how to define finite computational security. This follows the paradigm of AC (Maurer, 2012;Renner, 2011, 2016), and has been used in e.g., Banfi et al (2019); Coretti et al (2013); and Maurer et al (2012). In Sec.…”

Section: F Secure Quantum Message Transmission With Computational Sec...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Sec. VIII.F.2 we review the results from Banfi et al (2019) on computational security of quantum message transmission (QMT). And in Sec.…”

Section: F Secure Quantum Message Transmission With Computational Sec...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Exactly this was done in Banfi et al (2019), where the authors compose a PRF family with the informationtheoretic quantum message transmission (QMT) protocol from Sec. VIII.A.…”

Section: Secure Quantum Message Transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security in Quantum Cryptography

Portmann,

Renner

2021

Preprint

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Quantum cryptography exploits principles of quantum physics for the secure processing of information. A prominent example is secure communication, i.e., the task of transmitting confidential messages from one location to another. The cryptographic requirement here is that the transmitted messages remain inaccessible to anyone other than the designated recipients, even if the communication channel is untrusted. In classical cryptography, this can usually only be guaranteed under computational hardness assumptions, e.g., that factoring large integers is infeasible. In contrast, the security of quantum cryptography relies entirely on the laws of quantum mechanics. Here we review this physical notion of security, focusing on quantum key distribution and secure communication. CONTENTS I. Security from physical principles 2 A. Completeness of quantum mechanics 2 B. Correctness of quantum theory 3 II. Cryptographic security definitions 4 A. Real-world ideal-world paradigm 4 B. Abstract Cryptography 5 C. Example: the One-Time Pad 7 D. Abstract theory of cryptographic systems 8 E. Security definition 9 F. Interpretation of the security parameter 10 G. Instantiating systems 11

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Section: F Secure Quantum Message Transmission With Computational Sec...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In Sec. VIII.F.2 we review the results from Banfi et al (2019) on computational security of quantum message transmission (QMT). And in Sec.…”

Section: F Secure Quantum Message Transmission With Computational Sec...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Security in Quantum Cryptography

Portmann,

Renner

2021

Preprint

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“…The security notions from [3] were recently examined from a composable security point of view [6]. The conclusion of that work was that the "real/ideal" definition of Quantum Authenticated Encryption from [3] does guarantee composable security.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…where k = vk, sk. 6 In particular, Equation 26 implies that there exists a Stinespring dilation unitary W Ver vk of Ver vk such that…”

Section: A4 Detailed Proof Of Theorem 511mentioning

confidence: 99%

Can you sign a quantum state?

Alagic

Gagliardoni

Majenz

2021

Quantum

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Cryptography with quantum states exhibits a number of surprising and counterintuitive features. In a 2002 work, Barnum et al. argue that these features imply that digital signatures for quantum states are impossible (Barnum et al., FOCS 2002). In this work, we ask: can all forms of signing quantum data, even in a possibly weak sense, be completely ruled out? We give two results which shed significant light on this basic question.First, we prove an impossibility result for digital signatures for quantum data, which extends the result of Barnum et al. Specifically, we show that no nontrivial combination of correctness and security requirements can be fulfilled, beyond what is achievable simply by measuring the quantum message and then signing the outcome. In other words, only classical signature schemes exist.We then show a positive result: a quantum state can be signed with the same security guarantees as classically, provided that it is also encrypted with the public key of the intended recipient. Following classical nomenclature, we call this notion quantum signcryption. Classically, signcryption is only interesting if it provides superior performance to encypt-then-sign. Quantumly, it is far more interesting: it is the only signing method available. We develop "as-strong-as-classical" security definitions for quantum signcryption and give secure constructions based on post-quantum public-key primitives. Along the way, we show that a natural hybrid method of combining classical and quantum schemes can be used to "upgrade" a secure classical scheme to the fully-quantum setting, in a wide range of cryptographic settings including signcryption, authenticated encryption, and CCA security.

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On the Security of Offloading Post-Processing for Quantum Key Distribution

Lorünser

Krenn

Pacher

et al. 2023

Entropy

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Quantum key distribution (QKD) has been researched for almost four decades and is currently making its way to commercial applications. However, deployment of the technology at scale is challenging because of the very particular nature of QKD and its physical limitations. Among other issues, QKD is computationally intensive in the post-processing phase, and devices are therefore complex and power hungry, which leads to problems in certain application scenarios. In this work, we study the possibility to offload computationally intensive parts in the QKD post-processing stack in a secure way to untrusted hardware. We show how error correction can be securely offloaded for discrete-variable QKD to a single untrusted server and that the same method cannot be used for long-distance continuous-variable QKD. Furthermore, we analyze possibilities for multi-server protocols to be used for error correction and privacy amplification. Even in cases where it is not possible to offload to an external server, being able to delegate computation to untrusted hardware components on the device itself could improve the cost and certification effort for device manufacturers.

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Composable and Finite Computational Security of Quantum Message Transmission

Cited by 3 publications

References 34 publications

Security in Quantum Cryptography

Security in Quantum Cryptography

Can you sign a quantum state?

On the Security of Offloading Post-Processing for Quantum Key Distribution

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