Composite and Loose Concepts, Historical Analogies, and the Logic of Control in Comparative Historical Analysis

Abstract

ABSTRACT:The use of controlled comparisons pervades comparative historical analysis. Heated debates have surrounded the methodological purchase of such comparisons. However, the quality and validity of the conceptual building blocks on which the comparisons are based have largely been ignored. This paper discusses a particular problem pertaining to these issues: the danger of creating false historical analogies which do not serve to control for relevant explanatory factors. It is argued that this danger increases when we use composite ('thick') concepts which are aggregated via a ('loose') family resemblance logic. It is demonstrated that this problem seriously affects the way the concept of feudalism has entered comparative historical analysis. On this basis, an alternative conceptual strategy-centered on teasing out the core attributes of thick and loose concepts-is proposed 3 COMPOSITE AND LOOSE CONCEPTS, HISTORICAL ANALOGIES, AND THE LOGIC OF CONTROL IN COMPARATIVE HISTORICAL ANALYSISHistorical sociologists have produced a series of influential attempts to answer some of the most important questions of social science, including questions concerning state formation, regime change, and the international order (e.g. Moore [1966Moore [ ]1991 Tilly 1990;Downing 1992;Ertman 1997; Hui 2005;Møller 2015). The methodological pros and cons of historical analysis have been the object of heated debates. A number of scholars have highlighted the ability of historical sociology to deal with endogeneity and causal complexity, timing and path dependency, to elucidate micro-foundations of causal relationships, and to investigate whether contextual factors suppress relationships in particular time periods (Skocpol and Somers 1980;Tilly 1984; Sewell 1996;Thelen 1999;Mahoney 2000;Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010;Boix 2011). Others have singled out a number of potential pitfalls of comparative historical research, including the many variables, small n-problem, the non-independence of cases, historical multicollinearity, and the tendency to fit theories to cases (Lijphart 1971;Bartolini 1993; Coppedge 2012; more generally, see Western 2001).In this paper, I focus on an issue that has been strangely absent in these debates.My point of departure here is that-as some have applauded (e.g. Skocpol 1979Skocpol , 1984Skocpol and Somers 1980) 2 Indeed, as we shall see in the examples below, controlled comparisons even enter some comparative historical analyses which emphatically claim not to resort to this logic.Part and parcel of the general debate about historical sociology outlined above has been a vibrant discussion about the methodological purchase of this logic of comparative control (Skocpol 1979;Skocpol and Somers 1980; Sartori 1991;Abbott 1991;Bartolini 1993; Sewell 1996; Mahoney 2003;Capoccia and Ziblatt 2010;Slater and Ziblatt 2013). However, the importance of the character and validity of the conceptual building blocks on which the logic of control is premised has been almost completely ignored. 3 Needless to say, some lumping is...

The Birth of Representative Institutions: The Case of the Crown of Aragon

“…15 However, the development of parliamentary constraints was very much a product of townsmen and nobles presenting a united front against monarchs, with the nobles as the senior partner. In that respect, there is also some support for the notion, prominent in authors such as Montesquieu and Tocqueville and later picked up by a large literature on feudalism, that the European nobility was instrumental for reining in monarchs (Blaydes and Chaney 2013; see also Møller 2016). While the rise of the towns is most important for turning assemblies into representative institutions, the opposition of the nobles seems to be a core cause of the later development of constraints on the executive.…”

The Ulysses Principle: A Criterial Framework for Reducing Bias When Enlisting the Work of Historians

“…13) define feudalism “as a system of military mobilization and organization distinct from manorialism, the economic system that provides the basis for feudalism.” Strayer 25 and Anderson operate with a very different understanding of feudalism, which has more to do with the political regime than with military organization (Fulbrook and Skocpol 1984:183-84; Møller 2015). 26 Consequently, Blaydes and Chaney’s work is characterized by conceptual inconsistency as a particular case might not be feudal in a military sense just because it is feudal in a political sense (Møller 2015, 2016).…”

“…Historians are acutely aware of this risk because they are, by training and general inclination, “suspicious of the way [other] historians constructed proofs of their hypotheses out of nonquantitative data” (Hexter 1979:250). However, it seems fair to say that much recent social science “doing history” has had a poor record in this respect (see, e.g., Kreuzer 2010; Møller 2016). There are probably many reasons why social scientists tend to treat history in a superficial way including scarce resources (for instance, limited language skills and training in collecting and analyzing primary sources), lack of interest in the historical facts in themselves, and incentives to frame findings in a resounding way and to publish them quickly.…”

Why Causal Mechanisms and Process Tracing Should Alter Case Selection Guidance

“…This design essentially employs an experimental logic to isolate the key difference among multiple cases (Gerring 2007:131-39; Lijphart 1971; Przeworski and Tenue 1970:31-34). Such controlled comparisons are both “ubiquitous” in and “indispensable” to comparative social research (Slater and Ziblatt 2013; see also Møller 2016). Landmark studies in this mold include Mahoney’s (2001:41-43) analysis of Central American regime dynamics, Smith’s (2007:55-60) seminal work on the resource curse, and Lieberman’s (2009:110-11) research on AIDS policy in Brazil and South Africa.…”