Compositional christology without Nestorianism

Crisp, Oliver D.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583164.003.0003

Cited by 22 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…8.These authors include Leftow (2002), 281–282; Stump (2003), 199; Crisp (2007), 65 and (2011) 58–59; and Le Poidevin (2009), 174. I have also appealed to it myself, together with Marmodoro and Hill (2010), 483–486.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Compositionalism, Nestorianism, and the principle of no co-member parts

Hill

2022

Rel. Stud.

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Compositionalists hold that God the Son became human by acquiring all the parts that ordinarily compose a human being (his ‘human nature’). To be orthodox, though, they must deny that Christ's human nature is a person, even though it has all the parts that human persons ordinarily have. One way to do this is by appealing to the principle that no member of a natural kind can have another member of the same kind as a proper part. Since Christ is a person, he cannot have another person as a part, so if his human nature is a part of him, it cannot be a person. This principle is defended on the grounds that it can resolve metaphysical problems involving apparently multiple individuals of the same natural kind that share the same space. I argue that this is a weak strategy. First, it leaves unanswered key questions about how and why the principle applies to the incarnation. Second, counter-examples to the principle exist, suggesting that it is not true. Third, there is a better solution to the kinds of metaphysical paradoxes for which this principle is usually invoked, but this solution cannot be applied to the case of Christ. Consequently, compositionalists should not rely on this principle as a means of avoiding Nestorianism.

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Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, different authors vary the thought experiment (sometimes it is Tibbles's tail that is detached, sometimes a hair), and they vary the terminology too (with different names being given to the portion of Tibbles that is not detached). For the sake of simplicity, I will use the version (and names) used by Crisp (2011), 58–59.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Compositionalism, Nestorianism, and the principle of no co-member parts

Hill

2022

Rel. Stud.

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“…35.For defences of models of this kind, see inter alia Leftow (2002), (2011); Stump (2002); Crisp (2011a). …”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

‘His death belongs to them’: an Edwardsean participatory model of atonement

Hill

2017

Rel. Stud.

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The Participatory Model of Atonement (PMA) offers an alternative view of Christian salvation, drawing on Pauline theology. It conceives of sin as a contagion which can usually be escaped only by dying. By ‘participating’ in Christ's death, the believer can escape its effects without having to die. This notion of ‘participation’ is obscure. I consider a possible way of clarifying it using metaphysical ideas taken from Jonathan Edwards. ‘Participation’ might involve becoming similar to Christ through the action of the Holy Spirit, to such a degree that a person might be called identical (in some sense) with Christ.

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“…I agree with his conclusion that the an-enhypostasia distinction should be understood according to a three-part concrete-nature Christology (Crisp 2007, 75). Nevertheless, his attempt to maintain the anhypostasia-enhypostasia distinction in accordance with Two-Consciousnesses Model seems unsatisfactory (Crisp 2011), for this model faces certain problems concerning Christ's self-consciousness and the possibility of an I-Thou relationship between the divine and human consciousnesses (Loke 2013, section 3). To elaborate, philosopher Tim Bayne observes that one would assume that Christ's "I" thoughts had the same referent irrespective of the consciousnesses in which they were tokened, and surely it would be possible for Christ to think of himself (as himself) in either of his consciousnesses (Bayne 2001, 136).…”

Section: He Argues Thatmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the An-Enhypostasia Distinction and Three-Part Concrete-Nature Christology: The Divine Preconscious Model

Loke¹

2014

JAT

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Oliver Crisp argues that the an-enhypostasia distinction should be understood according to a three-part concrete-nature Christology. Nevertheless, his attempt to maintain the anhypostasiaenhypostasia distinction in accordance with Two-Consciousnesses Model seems unsatisfactory, for this model faces certain problems concerning Christ's self-consciousness and the possibility of an I-Thou relationship between the divine and human consciousnesses. I argue that the Divine Preconscious Model provides an alternative, novel account of three-part concrete-nature Christology which avoids these and other problems, and which maintains the anhypostasiaenhypostasia distinction as follows: the human nature (the aspect of his consciousness which had human properties, his human preconscious and human body) did not exist as a person independent of its assumption by the Word (anhypostasia), while from the first moment of the Incarnation the human nature existed "in" a particular person (enhypostasia).

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Compositional christology without Nestorianism

Cited by 22 publications

References 0 publications

Compositionalism, Nestorianism, and the principle of no co-member parts

Compositionalism, Nestorianism, and the principle of no co-member parts

‘His death belongs to them’: an Edwardsean participatory model of atonement

On the An-Enhypostasia Distinction and Three-Part Concrete-Nature Christology: The Divine Preconscious Model

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