Compositional Security for Reentrant Applications

Reap the Harvest on Blockchain: A Survey of Yield Farming Protocols

“…To defend protocols against reentrancy attacks, researchers and developers have proposed a variety of frameworks and methods [86]. For example, Rodler et al [112] propose a backward compatible approach based on run-time monitoring and validation to protect smart contracts on Ethereum; Das et al [73] propose a reentrancy-aware language called Nomos, which enforces reentrancy security using resourceaware session types; Cecchetti et al [66] first formalize the reentrancy interface on general distributed systems and then leverage information flow control to automatically fix defective smart contracts. However, with the increasing complexity and variety of DeFi protocols, reentrancy attacks will also become increasingly difficult to detect and counter.…”

Smart Contract Synthesis Modulo Hyperproperties

“…The analysis of smart contract with respect to hyperproperties has not received enough attention yet. A recent approach uses type-checking to ensure information flow policies such as integrity in smart contracts in the context of reentrancy attacks [1]. Other hyperproperties identified in the context of smart contracts are integrity properties to prevent reentrancy attacks [33], [34] X.…”

“…smart contracts focuses on verifying concrete information flow policies such as integrity, which are enforced using languagebased methods [1], [2]. Hyperproperties are not limited to information flow policies, though.…”

TxT: Real-time Transaction Encapsulation for Ethereum Smart Contracts

“…Following the common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVE) database, the smart contract weakness classification and test cases (SWC) registry [3] identifies 37 classes of known smart contract vulnerabilities (as of January 2022). To counter the security threats, different types of defense tools have been developed, including syntactic analyzers [4], [5], security scanners based on symbolic execution [6], [7], fuzzing tools [8], [9], transaction analyzers [10], [11], security libraries [12], [13], formal defense methods [14], [15], and various hybrid analysis approaches [16], [17]. In this work, we scrutinize 106 existing smart contract security defense solutions, and find that each of them only addresses very few classes of known vulnerabilities.…”

“…Generally, all the existing smart contract defense methods have two design choices: 1) heuristic versus deterministic; and 2) detection versus verification (see Table I). Heuristic approaches use the best-effort judgement applied to all cases (e.g., Confuzzius [8], sFuzz [18], Harvey [19]), while deterministic designs guarantee the correctness at the expense of rejecting a small number of cases (such as KEVM [20], SeRIF [14], and eThor [5]). Detection tools identify known vulnerabilities (e.g., Oyente [7], Securify [21]), while verification tools aim at confirming various safety properties (examples are VerX [22] and ZEUS [6]).…”