Compulsory Voting and Parties’ Vote‐Seeking Strategies

Abstract

I advance a theory about how compulsory voting affects the behavior of political parties. The theory suggests that parties will pivot toward programmatic vote‐seeking strategies and away from clientelistic tactics, such as vote buying, where voting is compulsory. I test my expectations in three separate studies, using several data sources and empirical approaches. In Study 1, cross‐national analyses show that parties behave more programmatically under compulsory voting and that vote buying is less common where voting is mandatory. In Study 2, synthetic control and difference‐in‐differences analyses show that a switch to compulsory voting in Thailand produced an increase in programmatic vote seeking. In Study 3, a list experiment conducted in tandem with a natural experiment shows that compulsory voting leads parties to rely less on vote‐buying tactics in Argentina. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings, which together are broadly supportive of my theoretical expectations.

Where is the class bias attenuation? The consequences of adopting compulsory voting in Austria-Hungary in 1907

“…But a large part of linkages between voters and parties is not programmatic, but clientelistic (Kitschelt, 2000). On the one hand, parties operating under CV were shown to rely less on clientelistic vote-seeking strategies and more on programmatic ones (Singh, 2019b). On the other hand, there is also evidence, that one particular clientelistic strategyvote buying which rewards voters for switching their vote choiceis actually fostered by CV because CV increases the costs of abstaining and the number of cheap vote-buying targets (Gans-Morse et al, 2014;León, 2017).…”

“…This is the hallmark of studies studying the subnational adoption of CV (Fowler, 2013;Ferwerda, 2014;Bechtel et al, 2016;Hoffman et al, 2017;Gäbler et al, 2020). As the DiD design presupposes a parallel trends assumption (that trends in the dependent variable in the control and treatment groups would be the same in the absence of the treatment), other research on the effects of CV has utilized the synthetic control method that relaxes this assumption (Carey and Horiuchi, 2017;Bechtel et al, 2018;Singh, 2019b;Feitosa et al, 2020). Second, the Austro-Hungarian statistical office reported turnout also by occupational categories in all 17 kingdoms and lands in the 1907 election, thus providing figures there that are usually unavailable in modern-day elections.…”

Representing Silence in Politics

“…Some abstention might turn into explicit protest, for instance, through intentional spoiling of the vote or "none of the above" votes (if the option exists). But invalid votesblank or accidently spoilt-are still likely to be cast by the politically unknowledgeable, uninterested, untrusting, and disaffected (Singh 2019). Their votes will mix elements of commission and omission, and where they are meant as protest, this might now-confusinglyinclude protest against compulsory voting itself.…”

“…This finding may have less to do with voters' choice than with the supply side of representation. Compulsory voting increases the adoption of programmatic vote-seeking strategies, involving non-contingent policy bundles aimed at large groups rather than subgroups (Singh 2019). It may also encourage a focus on the politically sophisticated-seen as more likely to switch their vote in response to policy changes-and to persuasion being pursued over mobilization (Singh 2019).…”

“…Compulsory voting increases the adoption of programmatic vote-seeking strategies, involving non-contingent policy bundles aimed at large groups rather than subgroups (Singh 2019). It may also encourage a focus on the politically sophisticated-seen as more likely to switch their vote in response to policy changes-and to persuasion being pursued over mobilization (Singh 2019). Thus for most of those previously exiting silently into abstention who are now forced to turn out, compulsory voting may produce some indirect responsiveness by preventing wider distortions of the electoral signal, but not necessarily foster the formation of and mobilization around their interests.…”