Computational enactivism under the free energy principle

Korbak, Tomasz

doi:10.1007/s11229-019-02243-4

Cited by 21 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 62 publications

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“…One can push this argument even further, and argue that the statistical notions (e.g., Bayesian inference, estimation) used by FEP are stretched beyond explanatory usefulness given that FEP applies just as equally to non-neural bacteria as it does to more complex organisms with nervous systems. Descriptions of adaptive behaviour which make use of inference as such are thus seen as uninformative and may be more fruitfully replaced with explanations involving the idea that certain states of the system become dynamically coupled with certain states outside the system via generalized synchrony (Bruineberg et al, 2016;Korbak, 2019).…”

Section: Focusing On Content-based Aspects Of Fepmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…See(Korbak, 2019), who in defending a computational-enactivist view of FEP, argues that eliminativism with respect to algorithmic variational inference fails at certain levels of complexity at which dynamic coupling (generalised synchronicity) cannot sufficiently account for certain phenomena. And for a contrasting view that at progressively higher levels of complexity, variational inference will be considerably to be intractable without taking the agent's being environmentally embedded into account, see(van Rooij et al, 2019).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation

Sims

Pezzulo

2021

Synthese

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Predictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle (FEP)—a normative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., representational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpretations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies (or fails to qualify) as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle (FEP) instrumentally to distinguish four main notions of representation, which focus on organizational, structural, content-related and functional aspects, respectively. The various ways that these different aspects matter in arriving at representational or non-representational interpretations of the Free Energy Principle are discussed. We also discuss how the Free Energy Principle may be seen as a unified view where terms that traditionally belong to different ontologies—e.g., notions of model and expectation versus notions of autopoiesis and synchronization—can be harmonized. However, rather than attempting to settle the representationalist versus non-representationalist debate and reveal something about what representations are simpliciter, this paper demonstrates how the Free Energy Principle may be used to reveal something about those partaking in the debate; namely, what our hidden assumptions about what representations are—assumptions that act as sometimes antithetical starting points in this persistent philosophical debate.

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Section: Focusing On Content-based Aspects Of Fepmentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation

Sims

Pezzulo

2021

Synthese

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“…One may read that the models in FEP are ‘ representations of dynamical systems’, and ‘may provide a metaphor for behaviour with different timescales and biological substrates’ (Friston, 2013, p. 1, emphases added); that is, rather than an objective part of nature, the model is human-made: ‘an information-theoretic construct ’ (Constant, Ramstead, et al, 2018, p. 5, emphasis added). Furthermore, what makes it interesting is that ‘it connects probabilistic descriptions of the states occupied by biological systems to probabilistic modelling or inference as described by Bayesian probability and information theory’ (Friston, 2012, p. 2101, emphasis added; Korbak, 2019, p. 3). 4…”

Section: A Model Of Life and Life’s Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 8. Rescorla (2016) and Korbak (2019, p. 16) appear to defend something akin to this position. …”

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confidence: 98%

Living models or life modelled? On the use of models in the free energy principle

2020

Adaptive Behavior

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The free energy principle (FEP) is an information-theoretic approach to living systems. FEP characterizes life by living systems’ resistance to the second law of thermodynamics: living systems do not randomly visit the possible states, but actively work to remain within a set of viable states. In FEP, this is modelled mathematically. Yet, the status of these models is typically unclear: are these models employed by organisms or strictly scientific tools of understanding? In this article, I argue for an instrumentalist take on models in FEP. I shall argue that models used as instruments for knowledge by scientists and models as implemented by organisms to navigate the world are being conflated, which leads to erroneous conclusions. I further argue that a realist position is unwarranted. First, it overgenerates models and thus trivializes the notion of modelling. Second, even when the mathematical mechanisms described by FEP are implemented in an organism, they do not constitute a model. They are covariational, not representational in nature, and precede the social practices that have shaped our scientific modelling practice. I finally argue that the above arguments do not affect the instrumentalist position. An instrumentalist approach can further add to conceptual clarity in the FEP literature.

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“…Others think FEP may serve to reconcile enaction with positions enactivists criticize, such as modern versions of representationalism (Clark 2015;Constant, Clark, and Friston 2021;Wiese and Friston 2021). Others adopt a different tone that suggests that FEP has overcome the limitations of the enactive approach, or subsumes or absorbs autopoietic and enactive theories (e.g., Allen and Friston 2018; "FEP subsumes autopoiesis", Korbak 2021Korbak , 2747; "FEP provides an implementation of enactivism, and in a sense supersedes or absorbs classical (i.e., autopoietic) formulations," Ramstead et al 2021, 59).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Laying down a forking path: Incompatibilities between enaction and the free energy principle

E¹,

Thompson²,

Rd³

2021

Preprint

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Several authors have made claims about the compatibility between the Free Energy Principle (FEP) and theories of autopoiesis and enaction. Many see these theories as natural partners or as making similar statements about the nature of biological and cognitive systems. We critically examine these claims and identify a series of misreadings and misinterpretations of key enactive concepts. In particular, we notice a tendency to disregard the operational definition of autopoiesis and the distinction between a system’s structure and its organization. Other misreadings concern the conflation of processes of self-distinction in operationally closed systems with Markov blankets. Deeper theoretical tensions underlie some of these misinterpretations. FEP assumes systems that reach a non-equilibrium steady state and are enveloped by a Markov blanket. We argue that these assumptions contradict the historicity of agency and sense-making that is explicit in the enactive approach. Enactive concepts such as adaptivity and agency are defined in terms of the modulation of parameters and constraints of the agent-environment coupling, which entail the possibility of redefinition of variable and parameter sets and of the dynamical laws affecting a system, a situation that escapes the assumptions of FEP. In addition, the enactive perspective foregrounds the enabling and constitutive roles played by the world in sense-making, agency, development, and the path-dependent diversity of human bodies and minds. We argue that this position is also in contradiction with the FEP. Once we move beyond superficial similarities, identify misreadings, and examine the theoretical commitments of the two approaches, we reach the conclusion that the FEP, as it stands formulated today, is profoundly incompatible with the theories of autopoiesis and enaction.

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Computational enactivism under the free energy principle

Cited by 21 publications

References 62 publications

Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation

Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation

Living models or life modelled? On the use of models in the free energy principle

Laying down a forking path: Incompatibilities between enaction and the free energy principle

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