With today's quantum processors venturing into regimes beyond the capabilities of classical devices, we face the challenge to verify that these devices perform as intended, even when we cannot check their results on classical computers. In a recent breakthrough in computer science, a protocol was developed that allows the verification of the output of a computation performed by an untrusted quantum device based only on classical resources. 
Here, we follow these ideas, and demonstrate in a first, proof-of-principle experiment the verification of the output of a quantum computation using only classical means on a small trapped-ion quantum processor.
We contrast this to verification protocols, which require trust and detailed hardware knowledge, as in gate-level benchmarking, or additional quantum resources in case we do not have access to or trust in the device to be tested. 
While our experimental demonstration uses a simplified version of Mahadev's protocol we demonstrate the necessary steps for verifying fully untrusted devices.
A scaled-up version of our protocol will allow for classical verification, requiring no hardware access or detailed knowledge of the tested device. Its security relies on post--quantum secure trapdoor functions within an interactive proof. The conceptually straightforward, but technologically challenging scaled-up version of the interactive proofs, considered here, can be used for a variety of additional tasks such as verifying quantum advantage, generating and certifying quantum randomness, or composable remote state preparation.