2016
DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9573-2
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Conceivability, possibility and the resurrection of material beings

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(1 citation statement)
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“…Rather, it must be some larger part of the recently deceased human person. Second, Atkinson () further questions the “conceivability” of such far‐removed stories given van Inwagen's () own form of scepticism about possibility claims . Third, Olson (, ) raises the problem that on van Inwagen's account, there must be some kind of path in space–time from this world to the next, which there does not seem to be.…”
Section: The Problems Of Life After Deathmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Rather, it must be some larger part of the recently deceased human person. Second, Atkinson () further questions the “conceivability” of such far‐removed stories given van Inwagen's () own form of scepticism about possibility claims . Third, Olson (, ) raises the problem that on van Inwagen's account, there must be some kind of path in space–time from this world to the next, which there does not seem to be.…”
Section: The Problems Of Life After Deathmentioning
confidence: 99%