Concentration of power in cabinets: Exploring the importance of the party political context

Abstract

Weakening of the cabinet collective and strengthening of prime ministers in parliamentary democracies have often been explained by the personality of state leaders or long-term societal changes such as increased public sector fragmentation, internationalisation and mediatisation of politics. This article points to short-term changes to explain developments in the executive centre. The argument is that different features of the cabinet, such as the number of parties, the coalition's fragility, and the cabinet's parliamentary basis, all affect the need for coordination and thus might lead to concentration of power in cabinet. The argument is substantiated through a qualitative case study of Norway. On the basis of semi-structured interviews with former ministers and secretaries general, the study shows that different features of cabinet can help explain the concentration of decision-making power seen in the last four Norwegian cabinets. The Norwegian case thus supports the notion that developments in the executive centre also depend on changes in the party political context.

The spy who loved me? Cross‐partisans in the core executive

“…Other factors that may influence what CPAs do—for example, their number and ministerial location—also vary. Although the Stoltenberg II cabinet was considered fragile by the media, both coalitions exhibited relatively few large political differences and a high level of cross‐partisan trust (Allern ; Kolltveit ). Better understanding of the relationship between the role of CPAs and the legislature's situational and systemic strength vis‐à‐vis the executive requires behavioural data from a greater number of cabinets, ideally across several countries.…”