Concept learning at different levels of abstraction by pigeons, monkeys, and people.

Roberts, William A.; Mazmanian, Dwight

doi:10.1037/0097-7403.14.3.247

Cited by 132 publications

(125 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…These results from Roberts and Mazmanian's (1988) study are interesting because they indicate that the supposedly intermediate basic categorical level for humans of 'bird' (Berlin, Breedlove, & Raven, 1973;Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, & Boyes-Braem, 1976) was not similarly the preferred categorical level for either squirrel monkey or pigeon. Rather, their apparent preferred level -as reflected in their discrimination performances -was instead the more concrete subordinate categorical distinction between 'kingfisher' and other bird species.…”

Section: Hierarchical Categorical Levelsmentioning

confidence: 66%

“…Also, Roberts and Mazmanian (1988) themselves were unable to identify the level of resemblance by which the squirrel monkeys and pigeons eventually learned the more abstract superordinate discrimination between animals and nonanimals. Their results from the nonhuman subjects in the 'kingfisher' versus other bird species discrimination task, however, are consistent with the view that animals are predisposed to learn categorical exemplars on the basis of simple physical resemblance.…”

Section: Hierarchical Categorical Levelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Human and nonhuman primates may differ in the way that they hierarchically organize natural categories. Roberts & Mazmanian (1988) for example, found that both squirrel monkeys (Saimiri scurieus) and pigeons (Columba livia), like human subjects, quickly learned to discriminate pictures of kingfisher birds (Alcedo atthis) from other bird species. The humans also readily learned to discriminate pictures containing animals -including insects, fish, amphibians, reptiles, and mammalsfrom those that did not contain any animal.…”

Section: Hierarchical Categorical Levelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Categorical perception and conceptual judgments by nonhuman primates: the paleological monkey and the analogical ape

Thompson¹

2000

Cognitive Science

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Studies of the conceptual abilities of nonhuman primates demonstrate the substantial range of these abilities as well as their limitations. Such abilities range from categorization on the basis of shared physical attributes, associative relations and functions to abstract concepts as reflected in analogical reasoning about relations between relations. The pattern of results from these studies point to a fundamental distinction between monkeys and apes in both their implicit and explicit conceptual capacities. Monkeys, but not apes, might be best regarded as "paleo-logicans" in the sense that they form common class concepts of identity on the basis of identical predicates (i.e., shared features). The discrimination of presumably more abstract relations commonly involves relatively simple procedural strategies mediated by associative processes likely shared by all mammals. There is no evidence that monkeys can perceive, let alone judge, relations-between-relations. This analogical conceptual capacity is found only in chimpanzees and humans. Interestingly, the "analogical ape," like the child, can make its analogical knowledge explicit only if it is first provided with a symbol system by which propositional representations can be encoded and manipulated

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Section: Hierarchical Categorical Levelsmentioning

confidence: 66%

Section: Hierarchical Categorical Levelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Hierarchical Categorical Levelsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Categorical perception and conceptual judgments by nonhuman primates: the paleological monkey and the analogical ape

Thompson¹

2000

Cognitive Science

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“…Differential similarity influences the responses of nonhuman animals in much the same way as it influences the speaking of humans. Although it may not always be the case that humans and nonhuman animals categorize stimuli in the same way (see Roberts & Mazmanian, 1988;Yoshikubo, 1985;Fujita, 1987), based on the results presented here, one can conclude that both conceptual behavior and its underlying cognitive processes are generally similar in humans and nonhuman animals.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 91%

Concept Learning in Animals

Zentall¹,

Wasserman²,

Lazareva³

et al. 2008

CCBR

166

141

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Generally speaking, the study of concepts in cognitive psychology is anthropocentric with respect to both content and theory. A broader comparative perspective on the various forms of concept learning not only provides a more inclusive view of conceptual behavior, but it also provides a more objective perspective from which to identify underlying processes. We suggest that several of the major varieties of conceptual classes claimed to be uniquely human are also exhibited by nonhuman animals. We present evidence for the formation of several sorts of conceptual stimulus classes by nonhuman animals: perceptual classes involving classification according to the shared attributes of objects, associative classes or functional equivalences in which stimuli form a class based on common associations, relational classes, in which the conceptual relationship between or among stimuli defines the class, and relations between relations, in which the conceptual (analogical) relationship is defined by the relation between classes of stimuli. We conclude that not only are nonhuman animals capable of acquiring a wide variety of concepts, but that the underlying processes that determine concept learning are also likely to be quite similar.

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“…The study of categorical abilities has been extended to nonhuman primates (e.g. Schrier et al, 1984;Yoshikubo, 1985;D'Amato and van Sant, 1988;Roberts and Mazmanian, 1988).…”

Section: Open-ended Categoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Categories as paradigms for comparative cognition

Zayan¹,

Vauclair

1998

Behavioural Processes

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Forming categories is a basic cognitive operation allowing animals to attain concepts, i.e. to represent various classes of objects, natural or artificial, physical or social. Categories can also be formed about the relations holding among these objects, notably similarity and identity. Some of the cognitive processes involved in categorisation will be enumerated. Also, special reference will be made to a much neglected area of research, that of social representations. Here, animals conceive the natural class of their conspecifics as well as the relationships established between them in groups. Two types of social categories were mentioned: (1) intraspecies recognition including recognition of individual conspecifics; and (2) representation of dominance hierarchies and of their transitivity in linear orders.

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Concept learning at different levels of abstraction by pigeons, monkeys, and people.

Cited by 132 publications

References 35 publications

Categorical perception and conceptual judgments by nonhuman primates: the paleological monkey and the analogical ape

Categorical perception and conceptual judgments by nonhuman primates: the paleological monkey and the analogical ape

Concept Learning in Animals

Categories as paradigms for comparative cognition

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