Interdisciplinary communication, and thus the rate of progress in scholarly understanding, would be greatly enhanced if scholars had access to a universal classification of documents or ideas not grounded in particular disciplines or cultures. Such a classification is feasible if complex concepts can be understood as some combination of more basic concepts. There appear to be five main types of concept theory in the philosophical literature. Each provides some support for the idea of breaking complex into basic concepts that can be understood across disciplines or cultures, but each has detractors. None of these criticisms represents a substantive obstacle to breaking complex concepts into basic concepts within information science. Can we take the subject entries in existing universal but disciplinebased classifications, and break these into a set of more basic concepts that can be applied across disciplinary classes? The author performs this sort of analysis for Dewey classes 300 to 339.9. This analysis will serve to identify the sort of 'basic concepts' that would lie at the heart of a truly universal classification. There are two key types of basic concept: the things we study (individuals, rocks, trees), and the relationships among these (talking, moving, paying).
IntroductionTo what extent is it possible to define or classify concepts such that these can be understood in a similar way across disciplines and cultures? If this is possible, then a universal classification of documents or ideas not grounded in particular disciplines or cultures might be possible. If not, then information scientists might wish to focus on domain-specific classifications and translations across pairs of these. Many information scientists take the latter point of view. In particular, Hjørland (2009) has argued that a pragmatic philosophical perspective supports only domain analysis. I have disagreed with this conclusion in several places (Szostak, 2008a(Szostak, , 2008b(Szostak, , 2010a(Szostak, , 2010b. Received March 7, 2011; revised July 18, 2011; accepted July 19, 2011 © 2011 ASIS&T • Published online 31 August 2011 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com). DOI: 10.1002/asi.21635 The crux of our disagreement, it turns out, rests on whether complex concepts can be broken into a set of basic concepts that can be understood similarly across groups. Hjørland would argue that breaking complex concepts into basic concepts, which can then be understood similarly across disciplines, reflects a "rationalist" epistemology. (He would argue that all concepts can only be understood in terms of theories and thus a web of other complex concepts that will inevitably differ across communities.) Yet he would admit that a pragmatic epistemology does not exclude taking a rationalist approach as long as this works (see Dousa, 2010, for a discussion of the implications of different types of pragmatism).The disagreement is important precisely because interdisciplinary communication, and thus the rate of scholarly advance, would be encou...