2001
DOI: 10.1080/14623520120097224
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Conceptual constraints on thinking about genocide

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Cited by 31 publications
(17 citation statements)
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“…Moreover, without adequate historical, political, sociological and anthropological knowledge of the genocide context, we run the risk of narrowing genocide to fit the model of the ''prototypical'' genocide, the Holocaust (see Moshman 2001), in which a totalitarian state was the prime initiator of genocidal activity. The fundamental role of the Nazi state in the Holocaust has led to a prioritisation of criminological theories of state crime in attempts to explain all genocides (see, for example, Alvarez 2001; for a sociological example, see Chalk and Jonassohn 1990).…”
Section: An 'Undisciplined' and Critical Criminology Of Genocidementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Moreover, without adequate historical, political, sociological and anthropological knowledge of the genocide context, we run the risk of narrowing genocide to fit the model of the ''prototypical'' genocide, the Holocaust (see Moshman 2001), in which a totalitarian state was the prime initiator of genocidal activity. The fundamental role of the Nazi state in the Holocaust has led to a prioritisation of criminological theories of state crime in attempts to explain all genocides (see, for example, Alvarez 2001; for a sociological example, see Chalk and Jonassohn 1990).…”
Section: An 'Undisciplined' and Critical Criminology Of Genocidementioning
confidence: 99%
“…But once we have done whatever we have done, for whatever reason, our moral identities motivate us to deny or dispute evidence and interpretations that make us look immoral. In particular, because genocide is widely seen as the most terrible of all crimes, and because most of us see ourselves as moral agents within a moral community, we are highly motivated to deny that anything we or our group do or have done is genocidal (Hamblett, 2005;Moshman, 2001Moshman, , 2004a.…”
Section: Denialmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Ongoing dehumanization of our victims is one method of not facing the genocidal nature of what we have done. Other methods of genocide denial range from brute rejection of the facts to more subtle means such as not investigating what we don't want to know; selectively remembering what we already know; gerrymandering the definition of genocide to exclude our own actions; recontextualizing historical circumstances to render our actions normal, understandable, or inevitable; and educating our children with history textbooks devised primarily for the purpose of instilling patriotism (Chomsky, 1989;Cohen, 2001;Hulsizer, Munro, Fagerlin, & Taylor, 2004;Loewen, 1995;Moshman, 2001Moshman, , 2004a.…”
Section: Denialmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Likewise, Muammar Gadaffi's use of language that was reminiscent of the Rwandan genocide, such as urging his supporters to attack the protesters he labeled as “cockroaches,” alarmed the international community and contributed to support for the intervention in Libya (ICRtoP, ). However, while there have been theoretical discussions around the role of prototypes in how we understand genocide (e.g., Moshman, ), we are not aware of empirical research that has examined the influence of such prototypes on peoples’ response to this important social issue. The present research therefore applies prototype theory to the question of how third parties (i.e., people who are not involved in the violence as victims, perpetrators, or direct bystanders) understand genocide, and how that understanding influences both their evaluations of cases of mass violence and their support for interventions.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%