Conceptual Ethics II

Abstract

Which concepts should we use to think and talk about the world, and to do all of the other things that mental and linguistic representation facilitates? This is the guiding question of the field that we call 'conceptual ethics'. Conceptual ethics is not often discussed as its own systematic branch of normative theory. A case can nevertheless be made that the field is already quite active, with contributions coming in from areas as diverse as fundamental metaphysics and social/political philosophy. In this pair of papers, we try to unify the field, reflecting on its basic nature, structure, and methodology.

Introduction

“…³¹ See, for example, Haslanger (2000) and Anderson (2001). For discussion, see Burgess and Plunkett (2013b). ameliorative strategies that, at least prima facie, seem available.…”

Metaphysical Disputes and Metalinguistic Negotiation

“… Burgess and Plunkett likewise suggest that certain forms of eliminativism can be understood as the position that we ought to stop using a given term or concept (, 1103). They also plausibly suggest that revolutionary fictionalists can be seen as taking the position that we ought to use a set of terms within the scope of a pretense. …”

Conceptual History, Conceptual Ethics, and the Aims of Inquiry: A Framework for Thinking about the Relevance of the History/Genealogy of Concepts to Normative Inquiry

“…20 Before moving on, I want to briefly introduce a bit of terminology to help keep track of things moving forward. In a pair of recent co-authored papers, Alexis Burgess and I have introduced the term conceptual ethics to refer to the following: normative and evaluative issues about thought and talk (Burgess & Plunkett 2013a;2013b). The central issues we focus on are evaluative issues about which concepts are better or worse (for use by a given agent, in a given context), and normative issues about which concepts an agent should use (in a given context).…”