A shortage of skilled laborers has constrained the new development path called Construction 4.0, which is proposed to improve the construction industry with advanced technologies. It should be noted that the mismatch between labor skills and technological progress will harm the sustainable development of the construction sector. In China, a three-tier management structure consisting of contractors, labor subcontractors, and laborers is widespread in the labor market. Considering the relationship between laborers and construction firms, promoting construction labor professionalization depends on the cooperation of general contractors and labor subcontractors. Previous studies have focused on training techniques and methods, but have neglected to investigate whether stakeholders are willing to cooperate in training labor. Considering that the standard workforce is more likely to receive human resource investment, this paper aims to analyze the strategic choice of related stakeholders in cultivating the standard workforce. Since evolutionary game theory has proven to be an effective method to study the symbiotic evolution between stakeholders, this paper will apply it to develop an evolutionary game model and conduct analysis. Moreover, this research examines how government incentive policy affects the dynamic evolution process of cultivating a standard workforce. The results suggest that without government incentives, general contractors and labor subcontractors tend to choose a contingent workforce. When the government subsidy reaches a certain level, general contractors and labor subcontractors are willing to cooperate in cultivating a standard workforce. Additionally, it is worth noting that compensation for labor subcontractors is relatively more effective than that for general contractors in promoting construction labor professionalization. Furthermore, some suggestions and countermeasures are proposed to help to cultivate a standard workforce in China.