Conceptualising State-Market Relations in Land and Property: The Mainstream Contribution of Neo-Classical and Welfare Economics

Abstract

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Housing Supply Limitations, Land Readjustment and the Ecological Performance of the Urban Landscape

“…Housing supply limitations might also derive from the institutional character of the real estate market. Examples of the limitations to housing supply deriving from real estate market aspects include the monopolistic or oligopolistic character of real estate markets [1,36,37], land ownership constraints due to asymmetric land distribution [38], the influence of 'mood or sentiment' on market participants' decision-making behaviour (leading to non-rational herd behaviour or clustering) [2] and the influence of subsidiarity principles on governance processes [3] or place-making strategies [3,37,39], which create geographically segmented rather than uniform land markets [37]. The distribution of transac-tion costs within these markets, such as information asymmetries [1], the interdependences among actors in land and real estate markets [24], the uncertainty concerning holdout problems that might prevent efficient land acquisition [24,40] or speculative land/option holdings by developers [36,41] illustrate how markets do not always respond rationally or efficiently to demand.…”

Planners as Market Actors: Rethinking State–Market Relations in Land and Property

“…Economic interpretations of relations between planning policy and property markets have been dominated by three mainstream approaches: neo-classical economics, welfare economics, 3 and increasingly new institutional economics (Adams et al, 2005a(Adams et al, , 2005b, each of which presents planners with a fundamentally different question. Whereas neoclassical economics asks how far planning policy directly affects the overall quantity of market supply and demand, welfare economics concentrates on the extent to which planning policy is able to overcome market failure, while new institutional economics focuses on its capacity to reduce (or indeed increase) market transaction costs (Adams et al, 2009a).…”

Carbon regulation and pathways for institutional transition in market-led housing systems: A case study of English housebuilders and zero carbon housing policy

“…Such pathways, however, are not always readily identifiable. New institutionalist perspectives take a strongly disaggregated view of market structures, emphasising the role of context, process and social relations in market activity (Adams et al., 2005). Previous work on the institutional dynamics of housing markets (Adams and Payne, 2011; Payne, 2009, 2013) has indicated differentiated institutional responses to state expectations based on existing behavioural norms.…”

“…Approaches have become increasingly target-centred and have attempted to achieve transformation though influencing building design and construction, occupational behaviour, energy generation and infrastructure provision (Glaeser and Kahn, 2010). However, due to the vulnerability and institutional complexity associated with housing markets (Adams et al, 2005), it is likely that housing market actors will find the transition to a low carbon economy 1 The term ÔspeculativeÕ in this context refers to activity by housebuilders based on an assumption of the risk of loss in return for the uncertain possibility of reward, through profit and saleability of product (Payne, 2013) 3 particularly challenging. Housing markets are inherently unstable, fragmented and subject to competing priorities surrounding functional utility, short and long-term value and investment return (Pacione, 2013).…”