Conceptualizing change in organizational cognition

Abstract

PurposeSecchi and Cowley (2016, 2018) propose a Radical approach to Organizational Cognition (ROC) as a way of studying cognitive processes in organizations. What distinguishes ROC from the established research on Organizational Cognition is that it remains faithful to radical, anti-representationalist principles of contemporary cognitive science. However, it is imperative for proponents of ROC to legitimize their approach by considering how it differs from the established research approach of Distributed Cognition (DCog). DCog is a potential contender to ROC in that it not only counters classical approaches to cognition but also provides valuable insights into cognition in organizational settings.Design/methodology/approachThe paper adopts a conceptual/theoretical approach that expands Secchi and Cowley's introduction of ROC.FindingsThe paper shows that DCog research presupposes a task-specification requirement, which entails that cognitive tasks are well-defined. Consequently, DCog research neglects cases of organizational becoming where tasks cannot be clearly demarcated for the or are well-known to the organization. This is the case with the introduction of novel tasks or technical devices. Moreover, the paper elaborates on ROC's 3M model by linking it with insights from the literature on organizational change. Thus, it explores how organizing can be explored as an emergent phenomenon that involves micro, meso and macro domain dynamics, which are shaped by synoptic and performative changes.Originality/valueThe present paper explores new grounds for ROC by not only expanding on its core model but also showing its potential for informing organizational theory and radical cognitive science research.

How systemic cognition enables epistemic engineering

“…However, it serves to pursue, for example, the meaning of the pilot's “light touching of the front edge of left thrust lever with the side of the pinky finger on his right hand, bumping it lightly in the direction of reduced thrust” (p. 112). For methodological reasons, as Gahrn-Andersen ( 2021 ) shows, the object of study concerns how humans act as parts of well-defined cognitive systems. In other words, given an extant epistemic definition of the task, the whole system (e.g., practice, organization) is viewed as a stable, supervening entity.…”