Conceptualizing the curse: two views on our responsibility for the ‘resource curse’

Abstract

This essay critically engages proposals by Thomas Pogge and Leif Wenar meant to combat 'the resource curse.' Pogge and Wenar call for boycotts against stealing oppressors, sharing the expectation that the boycotts will significantly contribute to economic and political reform in the target countries. In contrast, I argue that liberal democracies should indeed stop trading with dictators and civil warriors, but for inward rather than outward looking reasons. We, the citizens of liberal democracies through our elected governments, ought to boycott severely oppressive regimes for the sake of our own moral integrity*simply in order to stop being complicit in what is effectively massive scale armed robbery. This inward looking thesis is distinctive in three ways. First, it contrasts with the dominant assumption that global reform must be grounded in the achievement of better political and economic outcomes for others. Second, the inward look manages to avoid the profound empirical uncertainty associated with any attempt to predict the direct effects of global rule changes on domestic institutions. Third, by isolating each democracy's responsibility for each case of illicit trade, the inward looking strategy deals more adequately than the outward view with collective action problems, and therefore has a greater chance of grounding actual reforms, with whatever prospects for better outcomes they may entail.

Debts, Poverty and Justice

“…This is an argument that Nili makes, when he says, with respect to the borrowing privilege and the resource curse, that "the idea is that we need to stop our material complicity in crime for the sake of our own moral integrity, independently of any prospects for improved outcome for others." 13 Another possible normative consideration is that there is a human rights threshold that people are entitled to, and the lending system is forcing people below this threshold. Pogge seems to defend this view, but he does not make it explicit in connection with the lending rules 14 .…”

Liberal Integrity and Foreign Entanglement

“…A prominent normative argument emphasizes that at least some dictators ought not be recognized as legitimate vendors of natural resources, because they cannot claim valid authorization to sell these resources from their peoples—the real owners of state property. In the lack of such authorization, at least some dictators should be seen as stealing state property from their people, and corporations based in liberal democracies who transact with these dictators should accordingly be seen as trafficking in stolen goods (see, e.g., Pogge, 2001; 2008; Wenar 2008; 2011, Nili 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2013a; 2015a; 2015b). Most philosophers who have discussed natural resource trade with dictators have accordingly taken it for granted that this trade ought to be reformed and that the challenges involved concern institutional design, rather than any normative conundrums (see, e.g., Macedo 2003, 1732; Heath 2005, 198; Freeman 2006, 251).…”

Conditional coercion versus rights diagnostics

“…More generally, one might hold that conferring international privileges upon rights violators is morally wrong and ought not be done. There are several ways one might reach this conclusion: that by conferring the privileges one has contributed to harm (Pogge, 2002); that one is participating in the theft of others resources (Wenar, 2008); or that one should disengage from all associations with certain kinds of wrongdoing (Nili, 2011). These views suggest that rights diagnostics should not be adopted.…”