Inducing Compliance With International Humanitarian Law 2015
DOI: 10.1017/cbo9781316182369.022
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Cited by 4 publications
(4 citation statements)
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“…Typically, it is suggested that ‘the existing IHL framework may be inadequate for achieving maximum compliance … by armed non-State actors’ (Bradley, 2013: 131). More needs to be done to ‘buy’ them into the system (Krieger, 2013). In essence, the different legal status accorded to irregular forces, in these legally murky conflicts, is such as to discourage their compliance as it does not (fully) provide them with the normal ‘combatant’s privilege’ in any case (Berman, 2004: 7).…”
Section: The Dominant Diagnosis Of the State Of The Laws Of Warmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Typically, it is suggested that ‘the existing IHL framework may be inadequate for achieving maximum compliance … by armed non-State actors’ (Bradley, 2013: 131). More needs to be done to ‘buy’ them into the system (Krieger, 2013). In essence, the different legal status accorded to irregular forces, in these legally murky conflicts, is such as to discourage their compliance as it does not (fully) provide them with the normal ‘combatant’s privilege’ in any case (Berman, 2004: 7).…”
Section: The Dominant Diagnosis Of the State Of The Laws Of Warmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…However, in international law and political science, the debate has moved on. International legal scholars have increasingly focussed on the applicability, adaptability and compliance-pull of international humanitarian law in non-international armed conflicts (Bellal 2016;Fortein 2017;Krieger 2015;Rodenhäuser 2018). Political science research surrounding rebel governance has demonstrated that armed groups may provide governance structures where they have established some form of control over a territory or population (Mampilly 2011;Mampilly 2015a, 46;Weinstein 2007;Wood 2015, 21-24).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Where group structures have completely broken down and the fighting atomized, every combatant is his own commander and the traditional mechanisms for the implementation of international humanitarian law are wholly ineffective'. See D. Th¨urer, 'The "failed State" and international law', 31 violations, focusing on the Congolese legal system. 12 Kumbu and Kahombo provide in this sense some insights into the difficulties the Democratic Republic of Congo faces when attempting to effectively prosecute war crimes.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In her concluding ideas, Krieger affirms that '[t]he international community responds to the challenges which conflicts in war-torn areas of limited statehood pose for compliance with international humanitarian law by allocating competences to actors other than the State concerned'. 31 Although international organizations contribute to enforce this legal regime, this task remains dependent on their members, who may be reluctant to engage with armed groups. However, in today's IHL context in which the majority of armed conflicts include at least one organized NSAG, respect for IHL can only be achieved through their engagement.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%