2010
DOI: 10.1016/j.jaccpubpol.2010.03.003
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Conditional accounting conservatism and future negative surprises: An empirical investigation

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Cited by 46 publications
(50 citation statements)
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“…However, IPO companies associated with conservative earnings management are more likely to be merged or acquired and earn positive abnormal returns. Indeed, Kim and Pevzner (2010) find that conservatism is associated with lower probability of future bad news.…”
Section: Earnings Management and Delisting Risk Of Iposmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…However, IPO companies associated with conservative earnings management are more likely to be merged or acquired and earn positive abnormal returns. Indeed, Kim and Pevzner (2010) find that conservatism is associated with lower probability of future bad news.…”
Section: Earnings Management and Delisting Risk Of Iposmentioning
confidence: 94%
“…In particular, accounting conservatism leads to contracting benefits for borrowers in the form of lower interest rates (Zhang, 2008) and firms that institute higher standards of corporate governance have exhibited higher levels of accounting conservatism (García Lara et al, 2009). Moreover, Kim and Pevzner (2010) find a reduction in future bad earnings news for firms with conservative accounting practices. Chung and Wynn (2008) find that directors' and officers' liability insurance coverage and cash indemnification for Canadian firms reduces expected legal liability, causing a decrease in conservative earnings.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 92%
“…Accounting conservatism mitigates the information asymmetry between informed and uninformed equity investors (Kim and Pevzner 2010;LaFond and Watts 2008) and helps monitor managers' behavior. By requiring higher verification standards for gains recognition, accounting conservatism reduces managers' ability and incentives to withhold information on expected losses, inflate earnings, or overstate net assets (Ahmed et al 2002;Holthausen and Watts 2001;Watts 2003;Watts and Zimmerman 1986).…”
Section: Accounting Conservatism Literaturementioning
confidence: 99%