1983
DOI: 10.1007/bf00143070
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Condorcet's paradox

Abstract: 162WILLIAM V. GEHRLEIN ns a = 1. In this example A > sB, B > sC and C> sA where A > sB denotes group simple majority preference for A over B. As a result, we find that there is no alternative capable of defeating all other candidates on the basis of pairwise simple majority elections. If n~ = 1, n: 3 = 1, n~ = 1, we find that A is the Condorcet winner or simple majority winner since A > sC and A > sB.

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

0
68
0
1

Year Published

1986
1986
2018
2018

Publication Types

Select...
5
3
1

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 176 publications
(69 citation statements)
references
References 81 publications
0
68
0
1
Order By: Relevance
“…However, existing approaches to annotation noise are primarily based on majority voting which requires a costly volume of redundant annotations. Moreover, as a local (per-pair) inconsistency filtering method, it has no effect on global inconsistency and even risks introducing additional inconsistency due to the well-known Condorcet's paradox [15].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…However, existing approaches to annotation noise are primarily based on majority voting which requires a costly volume of redundant annotations. Moreover, as a local (per-pair) inconsistency filtering method, it has no effect on global inconsistency and even risks introducing additional inconsistency due to the well-known Condorcet's paradox [15].…”
Section: Related Workmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This makes our model detect E → A as an outlier, contrary to the majority voting decision. In particular, the majority voting will introduce a loop comparison A < B < C < D < E < A which is the well-known Condorcet's paradox [15]. We further give two more extreme cases in Fig.…”
Section: Framework Formulationmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…A more general form lies in the possibility that pairwise majority voting may generate irrational -specifically, cyclical and thereby intransitive -collective preference orderings, such as xPy, yPz, and zPx. 5 (On the various forms of the paradox, see Gehrlein 1983. )…”
Section: Profilementioning
confidence: 99%
“…When majority preferences are cyclical, majority voting yields no stable winner-a phenomenon known as 'Condorcet's paradox' (e.g. Gehrlein 1983). Moreover, this problem is not restricted to majority voting.…”
Section: Basic Definitionsmentioning
confidence: 99%