Confidence-Building Measures in East Asia: A Japanese Perspective

Unexpected Companions

“…Building on the insights provided by neoliberal thought and the constructivist approach, we propose that bilateral cooperation that takes place before attempts of peaceful settlement acts as a form of confidence building measure (CBM) that weakens the level of distrust inherent in territorial disputes. CBMs are commonly discussed in the literature on disarmament and regional security policies (Asada, 1988;Kang and Kaseda, 2000;Rathmell, 2000), but the literature on territorial disputes has not recognized the important role that CBMs can play in territorial dispute settlement attempts. Interestingly, the use of CBMs is frequently noted in press statements regarding territorial dispute settlement attempts, which indicates that policy makers directly involved in settlement attempts are aware of the benefits of CBMs and are quick to apply them to their states' particular territorial disputes.…”

“…CBMs are designed to provide reassurances about intentions, reduce uncertainty between the disputing states, and increase predictability of future actions (Asada, 1988). They also improve the transparency of capabilities and intentions of the disputing states, and reduce the likelihood of unintentional armed clashes that result from miscalculation or suspicion (Rathmell, 2000).…”