Configural face processing impacts race disparities in humanization and trust

Cassidy, Brittany S.; Krendl, Anne C.; Stanko, Kathleen A.; Rydell, Robert J.; Young, Steven G.; Hugenberg, Kurt

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2017.06.018

Cited by 36 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 63 publications

(111 reference statements)

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“…The finding that lower SF were more useful with White than Black faces, and that this differential use of information was modulated by implicit racial bias, may be congruent with studies that have revealed that configural processing influences the perceived humanness of a face [65,66]. On the one part, many studies have shown that White individuals have a tendency to dehumanize Black individuals (see [67] for a review).…”

Section: Plos Onesupporting

confidence: 68%

Implicit race attitudes modulate visual information extraction for trustworthiness judgments

et al. 2020

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Black people are still considered to be one of the most stigmatized groups and have to face multiple prejudices that undermine their well-being. Assumptions and beliefs about other racial groups are quite pervasive and have been shown to impact basic social tasks such as face processing. For example, individuals with high racial prejudice conceptualize otherrace faces as less trustworthy and more criminal. However, it is unknown if implicit racial bias could modulate even low-level perceptual mechanisms such as spatial frequency (SF) extraction when judging the level of trustworthiness of other-race faces. The present study showed that although similar facial features are used to judge the trustworthiness of White and Black faces, own-race faces are processed in lower SF (i.e. coarse information such as the contour of the face and blurred shapes as opposed to high SF representing fine-grained information such as eyelashes or fine wrinkles). This pattern was modulated by implicit race biases: higher implicit biases are associated with a significantly higher reliance on low SF with White than with Black faces.

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Section: Plos Onesupporting

confidence: 68%

Implicit race attitudes modulate visual information extraction for trustworthiness judgments

et al. 2020

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“…Indeed, racial outgroups frequently elicit less configural processing than racial ingroup members (Michel, Rossion, Han, Chung, & Caldara, ; Rhodes, Hayward, & Winkler, ; Tanaka, Kiefer, & Bukach, ). Similarly, neurological data reveal that people are better able to decode the mental states (as measured by the ability to infer emotional states from images of the eye region) of same‐race compared to other‐race targets (Adams et al, ); and, as noted above, disrupting Whites' ability to configurally process Black faces yields particularly negative outcomes (Cassidy et al, ). Similar effects are observed for sexualized women.…”

Section: Faces From Mindsmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…Recent work by Cassidy et al () further extends this configural processing‐to‐mind link while also considering the effects of race. Whereas above, we reviewed evidence suggesting that phenotypically Black faces are ascribed less sophisticated minds, what happens when the human‐like configuration is disrupted as well?…”

Section: Minds From Facesmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Taken together, these studies implicate how we process faces in how we perceive minds. When the configural face processing typical of face perception is present, it allows us to see others as having fully human faculties and can even constrain otherwise dehumanizing responses (Cassidy et al, ). However, when face‐typical processing is disrupted, so too is the ability to infer sophisticated, human‐like minds from others' faces.…”

Section: Minds From Facesmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The face‐mind link: Why we see minds behind faces, and how others' minds change how we see their face

Deska

Hugenberg

2017

Social & Personality Psych

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Understanding others' minds has puzzled philosophers for centuries. Psychologists, too, have recently begun asking questions aboutwhat causes us to see another person as having complex or simple mental faculties. Here, we review recent evidence linking how we perceive others' faces with how we perceive others' mindsthe face-mind link. We first discuss research demonstrating a faceto-mind effect, showing that both certain facial features (e.g., eyes) and face perception processes (e.g., configural processing) can trigger the perception that a face has a mind. We then discuss recent evidence demonstrating a mind-to-face effect, showing that believing a person is inhumane (i.e., their mind) leads their face to be processed less like a face and more like an object. Finally, we consider both the consequences of this bidirectional face-mind link, and what the next steps may be in understanding how and why we infer minds from faces, and how and why beliefs about others' minds affects how we see their face.

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“…The main conscious emotional concomitants of partial dehumanization, as with prejudice, are hostility and fear. (Schwebel 2003: 66) Rhetoric to the effect that an out-group 'lacks trustworthiness' helps them be seen as subhuman, and, this can escalate a conflict by promoting prejudice and violence (Cassidy et al 2017;Kassin et al 2014). In contrast, the charge of unreliability has not been used to dehumanise in the same way.…”

Section: Ii3mentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust and Trustworthiness

2017

Commodification of Global Agrifood Systems and Agro-Ecology

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There has been a long-standing tendency in both the philosophical and nonphilosophical literature in the English-speaking world to view trust and trustworthiness primarily as three-place relations. Trust is: A trusts B to do X, and trustworthiness is: B doing X for A. This three-place schematic reflects English language use regarding the word "trust" as well as the widely-held beliefs that: 1) cooperation and knowledge acquisition are normally underpinned by trust and trustworthiness, 2) trust is a ubiquitous cognitive expectation classifiable as a distinct kind of reliance, and 3) trustworthiness is the ubiquitous fulfilment of that expectation classifiable as a distinct kind of reliability (often moralised-reliability). In this dissertation, it is argued that trust and trustworthiness are not three-place relations, and that thinking of them in this manner distorts the role they play in our lives. Instead, this dissertation proposes that trust and trustworthiness are each one-half of a two-place relation, and emphasises the special, private, complex, and interactive nature of this relation, rather than the behaviours (cooperation/reliance etc.) and expectations (belief/obligation etc.) often associated with it. The classification of trust and trustworthiness as being non-cognitive and non-moralised is essential, since a definitive feature of trust and trustworthiness is their remarkable capacity for non-conformity when it comes to the rules governing areas of our lives such as: social-communication, normative-behaviour, moral reasoning and moral action, truth, knowledge, rationality and agency. Acknowledging this anomalous rule-breaking facet of our humanity, which is similar to love, facilitates a better understanding of human behaviour and it allows us to divorce important questions about trust and trustworthiness from other distinct questions in epistemology and ethics. For David, for showing me trust and making me worthy. iv Acknowledgements Firstly, I would like to acknowledge my supervisor Michaelis Michael, for providing sound advice and considered guidance throughout my candidature. I would also like to thank the supportive staff in the Philosophy department at UNSW Sydney. In particular, my co-supervisor Melissa Merritt for introducing me to Iris Murdoch, and Markos Valaris for his role in sparking my initial interest in philosophy. I am grateful for the instruction provided by Professor Tony Attwood from Griffith University Queensland, who generously took the time to share his expertise in Theory of Mind with me. Both . Along with countless others, these individuals gently but determinedly give their time to share knowledge and resources with anyone willing to listen and learn. On a personal note, the irreplaceable individuals who supported all the other aspects of my life as I undertook this dissertation -my parents Lainie and Tony, my children Margaret and Hume, my dear friend Hamish, and my David -provided me with the love and trust, and so the expertise, that it really took to write this dissertati...

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Configural face processing impacts race disparities in humanization and trust

Cited by 36 publications

References 63 publications

Implicit race attitudes modulate visual information extraction for trustworthiness judgments

Implicit race attitudes modulate visual information extraction for trustworthiness judgments

The face‐mind link: Why we see minds behind faces, and how others' minds change how we see their face

Trust and Trustworthiness

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