Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia

Burg, Steven L.

doi:10.1515/9781400853373

Cited by 53 publications

(6 citation statements)

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“…This finding may be due to structural contradictions of the party in the decades prior to the party's demise. While there was evident interest in promoting a non‐nationalist agenda, there were considerable rivalries and redistributive conflicts among the parties of the various republics (Burg 1983; Woodward 1995a). Even within each republic's ruling party there was no consensus to pursue a liberal versus a nationalist agenda.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*

Massey

Hodson

Sekulić

2003

Nations and Nationalism

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This article analyses ethnic nationalism and liberalism as expressed in the views of Croatians in the aftermath of the 1991-5 war -a war during which ethnicnationalist rhetoric played a large role. Because the war was part of systemic change in the nation, including the adoption of more democratic and capitalist social formation, we also anticipated economic and political liberalism to be present among a sizeable portion of the population. We provide an analysis of the structural conditions fostering these sentiments, an analysis potentially applicable to a range of societies presently in transition. Based on 1996 survey interviews (N 5 2,202) conducted throughout Croatia, we show that ethnic nationalism in the Croatian context is more widely shared than is liberalism. The effect of religious fundamentalism, educational attainment and media exposure are as predicted, based on theories of liberalism and nationalism. Wartime experiences and position in the occupational system have a weaker and more mixed influence than hypothesised. Perhaps most importantly, we find that three out of five Croatians embrace both ethnic-national views and views that are distinctly liberal, suggesting that liberal nationalism is now dominant in Croatia. The characteristics of groups holding differing views suggest that recent events and current changes in Croatia bode positively for continued growth of liberal sentiments, but this will not necessarily be at the expense of ethnic nationalism.Post-war Croatia provides an opportunity to examine several critical issues regarding state disintegration and nation formation. As with many nations in transition since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Croatia appears poised between two political agendas. On the one hand, it can continue in the postTudjman era to pursue a politics of ethnic identity that promotes interests and rights associated with being Croatian, assigning all others to the status of

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*

Massey

Hodson

Sekulić

2003

Nations and Nationalism

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“…Though the relative independence of each republic's LYC Party and the decentralized economic organization of the socialist Yugoslavia allowed the influence of the LYG to vary across republics, the role of the Party in Croatian society was not atypical. Croatia stood midway between the greater political influence exercised by the LYC in Serbia and its lesser involvement in Slovenia (Burg 1983). Croatia's economy was less productive and its inhabitants were less affluent than the Slovenes, but the economic performance and the standard of living were slightly higher than Serbia's and were superior to that of the southern republics.…”

Section: Ppeskea Rch Design and Analysis Vamablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Though Party membership was not an absolute prerequisite for any position in socialist Yugoslavia, persons occupying important political positions were expected to be Party loyalists, and it was assumed that promotions requiring Party approval could be facilitated if the candidate was a Party member (Burg 1983). Party membership was considered useful to one's advancement in a firm or a professional occupational career (Szelenyi 1987, 562), and most people could be expected to recognize this.]…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Women in the League of Yugoslav Communists

Massey¹,

Leach²,

Sekulić³

1997

Women & Politics

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“…Since 1966 Yugoslav leaders have pursued a "consociational" strategy for controlling ethnic conflict. They have deliberately fostered segmentation of the social, economic, and political systems along ethnic and regional cleavages, reserving cross-cleavage interaction for ruling party elites (Burg 1983a). Since then, regional leaderships have seen any effort to encourage Yugoslavism as an attempt to undermine their respective power bases and to encourage support for a more cen-tralized political order.…”

Section: Community Integration and Stability In Multinational Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These appear to have resulted in the equation of Yugoslavism with socialist patriotism and the classification of Yugoslav as a political rather than ethnic identity (Bakic 1985). Moreover, at the time the 1971 census was being taken, internationality conflict resulting from the rise of assertive nationalisms had already reached crisis proportions (Burg 1983a;Rusinow 1977).…”

Section: Community Integration and Stability In Multinational Statesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia

Burg

Berbaum

1989

Am Polit Sci Rev

Self Cite

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In 1981 a higher proportion of the multinational population of Yugoslavia chose to declare “Yugoslav” in place of an ethnic identity in response to the census question on nationality than ever before. We present arguments to support the interpretation of Yugoslav identity as evidence of shared political identity, and carry out an analysis of aggregate data on the level of social and material development, political socialization, and interethnic contact in the country's nearly five hundred counties to discover the sources of that identity. We find that with certain important regional variations, Yugoslav identity seems to be the product of interethnic contact and higher education rather than the level of material well-being. These findings support an interpretation of Yugoslav identity as evidence of diffuse support for the existence of a shared political community and suggest both the sources and vulnerabilities of Yugoslav stability.

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Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia

Cited by 53 publications

References 0 publications

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*

Women in the League of Yugoslav Communists

Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia

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Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia

Cited by 53 publications

References 0 publications

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia*

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia*

Women in the League of Yugoslav Communists

Community, Integration, and Stability in Multinational Yugoslavia

Contact Info

Product

Resources

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Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*

Nationalism, liberalism and liberal nationalism in post‐war Croatia^*