Conflict Resolution of Terrorists Conflicts in Southeast Asia

`We Don't Negotiate with Terrorists!': Legitimacy and Complexity in Terrorist Conflicts

“…Jason Burke (2004) argues that, at its height, it consisted of three elements: a hard core, a network of co-opted groups, and an ideology. 9 Despite continuing debate on Al-Qaeda's structure, most terrorism experts agree that its complexity makes the task of the analyst trying to understand the phenomenon and that of the policymaker trying to counter it more difficult (see, among others, Cronin, 2006;Hoffman, 2003Hoffman, , 2004Wilkinson, 2006;Neumann, 2007;Swanstrom & Bjornehed, 2004). Bruce Hoffman, widely seen as one of the key experts on Al-Qaeda, compares the group to the 'archetypal shark in the water', constantly regenerating, and warns that developments such as that of the emergence of Al-Qaeda make the 'traditional way of understanding terrorism and looking at terrorists based on organizational definitions and attributes .…”

“…The creation in the late 1970s of the MILF, itself a splinter group of a previous generation of Muslim insurgents, also predates Al-Qaeda. MILF founder and leader Salamat Hashim, however, had strong 'international Islamist ties', including with Osama bin Laden himself (ICG, 2004: 4;Abuza, 2003), and through training as well as financing the MILF is widely believed to have maintained links with Al-Qaeda and its close Southeast Asian-based ally Jemaah Islamiyah (ICG, 2004(ICG, , 2005Rogers, 2004;Abuza, 2006Abuza, , 2003Swanstrom & Bjornehed, 2004). After receiving training for its operatives in Pakistan and Afghanistan, 14 the MILF reportedly returned the favour by allowing foreign militants to use its numerous camps for training purposes, and may still be doing so to this day (ICG, 2004(ICG, , 2005Abuza, 2006).…”