Conflicted scientists: the “shared pool” dilemma of scientific advisory committees

Abstract

Science advisors play a critical role in government policy making, yet these advisors are often equally attractive to regulated industry. Despite efforts to manage conflicts of interest among science advisors, allegations of conflict frequently plague advisory committee deliberations or outcomes. This article examines what we term the "shared pool" dilemma using data collected from 92 members of 11 US Food and Drug Administration advisory committees. The results suggested science advisors were generally positive about their experiences on advisory committees and viewed the committee process as impartial. Written comments suggested that advisors linked the neutrality of the process to the success of the FDA's conflict-of-interest procedures. Even so, the advisors acknowledged the challenges associated with recruiting disinterested and qualified scientists to serve on advisory committees, reflecting the shared pool dilemma. Many advisors seemed more troubled about advisors participating when they lacked expertise than when they had minor conflicts of interest. SAGE PUBLICATIONS (www.sagepublications.com) PUBLIC UNDERSTANDING OF SCIENCE

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