Conflicting Reasons in the Small-Improvement Argument

Gustafsson, Johan E.; Espinoza, Nicolás

doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2009.648.x

Cited by 26 publications

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“…La question de savoir si cette conclusion est justifiée et, plus généralement, celle de savoir si la relation de parité axiologique a de réelles applications a suscité beaucoup d'intérêt dans la littérature (Chang, 1997(Chang, , 2002bHsieh, 2005;Peterson, 2007;Espinoza, 2008;Gustafsson et Espinoza, 2010;Carlson, 2011;Gustafsson, 2013b). Toutefois, dans cet article, je m'intéresserai à une question différente : celle de savoir comment nous pouvons analyser les relations de valeur standards et non standards.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences1

Rossi

2014

ateliers

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Comment pouvons-nous analyser des relations de valeur non standards, comme la parité axiologique, en termes d’attitudes appropriées? Wlodek Rabinowicz suggère que deux choses sont à parité si et seulement si il est à la fois permissible de préférer l’une à l’autre et permissible d’avoir la préférence contraire. Dans un article récent, Johan Gustafsson soutient toutefois que l’analyse de Rabinowicz viole un principe de symétrie entre valeurs et préférences, selon lequel il existe pour toute relation de valeur une relation de préférence correspondante (et vice-versa). À la lumière de ce principe, Gustafsson propose une analyse alternative, selon laquelle deux choses sont à parité si et seulement si il est requis d’entretenir ces choses en parité préférentielle. Dans cet article, j’examine en détail les arguments avancés par Gustafsson contre l’analyse de Rabinowicz et je montre qu’aucun d’eux n’est convaincant.How can we analyse non-standard value relations, such as axiological parity, in terms of fitting attitudes? Wlodek Rabinowicz has suggested that two items are on a par if and only if it is both permissible to prefer one to the other and permissible to have the opposite preference. In a recent paper, however, Johan Gustafsson has argued that Rabinowicz’s account violates a principle of value-preference symmetry, according to which for any value relation, there is a corresponding preference relation (and vice-versa). Following this principle, Gustafsson has proposed an alternative analysis, according to which two items are on a par if and only if one is required to hold these items preferentially on a par. In this paper, I examine in detail Gustafsson’s arguments against Rabinowicz’s analysis and show that none of them succeeds

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Section: Introductionunclassified

Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences1

Rossi

2014

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“…The argument is contested, but I do not discuss objections to it in this paper. See Espinoza (2008), Gustafsson and Espinoza (2009), Carlson (2010 a ) and Gustafsson (2013). On the related question of whether we should favour incommensurateness or vagueness see Qizilbash (2012).…”

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On Parity and the Intuition of Neutrality

Qizilbash¹

2017

Economics and Philosophy

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Abstract:On parity views of mere addition if someone (or a group of people) is added to the world at a range of well-being levels – or ‘neutral range’ – leaving existing people unaffected, addition is on a par with the initial situation. Two distinct parity views – ‘rough equality’ and fitting-attitudes views – defend the ‘intuition of neutrality’. The first can be interpreted or adjusted so that it can rebut John Broome's objection that the neutral range is wide. The two views respond in distinct ways to two of Broome's other objections. Both views can, nonetheless, be plausibly defended against these objections.

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“…However, as I suggest further on, it is not clear that all kinds of incommensurability must be understood in this way. 10 Cf Gustafsson and Espinoza (2010)…”

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On Locating Value in Making Moral Progress*

Rønnow-Rasmussen

2016

Ethic Theory Moral Prac

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The endeavour to locate value in moral progress faces various substantive as well as more formal challenges. This paper focuses on challenges of the latter kind. After some preliminaries, Section 3 introduces two general kinds of Bevaluative moral progress-claims^, and outlines a possible novel analysis of a (quasi) descriptive notion of moral progress. While Section 4 discusses certain logical features of betterness in light of recent work in value theory which are pertinent to the notion of moral progress, Sections 5 and 6 outline the ambiguous character of Bmaking moral progress^.

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Conflicting Reasons in the Small-Improvement Argument

Cited by 26 publications

References 0 publications

Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences1

Sur la symétrie présumée entre valeurs et préférences1

On Parity and the Intuition of Neutrality

On Locating Value in Making Moral Progress*

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