Benzing, U.S. Bilateral Non-Surrender Agreements 183 impression that merely not joining the Court would insufficiently protect its national interests, the United States has embarked on a campaign to actively ensure that the Court will not exercise jurisdiction over its nationals. Comments on U.S. policy range from "disbelief and bewilderment" 3 over harsh criticism to support. It has been observed that prospects for U.S. participation in the ICC in the foreseeable future look slim. 4 While the rhetoric on both sides of the divide continues to get progressively intemperate, commentators have drawn attention to the fact that much energy is wasted on criticising the U.S. approach and have proposed to "learn to deal with rejection". 5 This contribution proceeds from this basis and, rather than examining the U.S. position from a point of view of international policy, attempts to legally analyse a specific manner the U.S. rejection of the ICC has taken, i.e. efforts to prevent the surrender of U.S. nationals to the ICC by way of concluding a series of bilateral agreements with as many countries as possible. These accords have sometimes somewhat polemically been referred to as "bilateral impunity agreements", 6 or, given that they are purportedly based on article 98 (2) of the ICC Statute, simply "article 98 agreements". To avoid prejudgement of the legal quality of those agreements, as well as to steer clear of resorting to "international polemics", the present article adopts the more neutral term "bilateral non-surrender agreements". 7