Conflicts Of Interest And The Case Of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction And Strategic Issue Cycling

Moore, Don A.; Tetlock, Philip E.; Tanlu, Lloyd; Bazerman, Max H.

doi:10.5465/amr.2006.19379621

Cited by 510 publications

(433 citation statements)

References 89 publications

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“…Moore et al (2006) lembram que, nos Estados Unidos, os pesquisadores analisam o problema pela lente econômica, por meio da qual independência significa que os auditores escolhem fazer uma auditoria não viesada ou entram em conluio com as empresas.…”

Section: Teoria Da Agênciaunclassified

“…Sob o ponto de vista da fiscalização, Moore et al (2006) iniciaram uma discussão sobre a independência dos auditores nos Estados Unidos. Analisando a situação de contratação/demissão de uma firma de auditoria, descreveram uma situação em que o cliente pode avaliar a probabilidade de os auditores emitirem uma opinião afirmativa.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

“…Relataram uma prática de os auditores sinalizarem seu desejo de acomodar a situação, conhecida como low-balling: inicialmente, oferecem uma redução de preços para construir uma relação que pode se tornar proveitosa para ambos; mais adiante, de acordo com os interesses envolvidos, aumentam o preço dos serviços de auditoria ou complementam os rendimentos por meio da venda casada de outros serviços. Também afirmaram que grandes empresas de auditoria, cujos nomes são reconhecidos pelo mercado, são possuidoras de mais independência (MOORE et al, 2006). Salientando a complexidade desse assunto, destaca-se o estudo realizado por Silva e Cardozo (2012) no qual, ao compararem fraudes noticiadas no Brasil e nos Estados Unidos nos últimos 20 anos, concluíram que, nos EUA, 90,9% das demonstrações fraudulentas foram auditadas pelas cinco maiores empresas de auditoria na época, as Big Five (Pricewater house Coopers, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, KPMG, Ernst & Young e a falida Arthur Andersen), enquanto que, no Brasil, o percentual foi de apenas 31,6%.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

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Avaliação do sistema de combate às fraudes corporativas no Brasil

Perera

Freitas

Imoniana

2014

R. Contemp. Contab.

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Section: Teoria Da Agênciaunclassified

Section: Introductionunclassified

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Avaliação do sistema de combate às fraudes corporativas no Brasil

Perera

Freitas

Imoniana

2014

R. Contemp. Contab.

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“…Effective audit committee should block unjustified auditor switches as an incidence of opinion shopping (Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001). Moore et al (2006) argued that audit committee has to be responsible for selecting the external auditor and not the managers. The extant research on auditor choice has linked audit committee characteristics and auditor choice in individual tests (Abbott and Parker, 2000;Archambeault and DeZoort, 2001;Carcello and Neal, 2003;Lee et al, 2004).…”

Section: Audit Committee Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Internal corporate governance mechanisms and audit quality: Evidence from GCC region

Hassan¹,

Aljaaidi²,

Abidin³

et al. 2018

Int. j. adv. appl. sci.

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Using the suggestions of agency theory alone for predicting the auditor change behavior in the context of GCC countries is inappropriate because they were developed in countries with mature market-oriented economies. In this study, we examine the association of board of directors effectiveness (board of directors independence, size, financial expertise, meetings, nationality, international experience and CEO duality) and audit committee effectiveness (audit committee independence, size, financial expertise, meetings, nationality and international experience) with the incidence of auditor change among Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) public listed companies for the period 2005-2010. We posit that using an integration framework of agency theory, managerial grid theory, and attractionselection-attrition has more explanatory power to predict auditor change behavior in GCC setting, taking into account economic and behavioral issues. The results show that only board of directors' effectiveness is significantly associated with the incidence of auditor change. This study finds out that the economic and the behavioral activities are related to the audit demand in the GCC. Moreover, the study suggests that regulators, especially GCC stock exchanges, should force companies to disclose all relevant information related to auditor change in a transparent and timely manner, and increase law enforcement to enhance good corporate governance practices. For companies, this study proposes that they should put more emphasis on enhancing the role and the quality of the board of directors and audit committee members, as they are involved in the decision of auditor change.

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“…Moore, Tetlock, Tanlu, and Bazerman (2006) cite the lack of independence of American external auditors as one of the key factors in the series of financial scandals in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the following decade. The authors developed a "moral seduction theory" to explain the conflicts of interest faced by independent auditors.…”

Section: Information Asymmetry and Independentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Custos de auditoria e governança corporativa

Bortolon

Neto

Santos

2013

Rev. contab. finanç.

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The service provided by an independent audit is essential to the greater transparency and reliability of the financial reporting of public companies. The topics explored in the international literature include possible threats to the auditors' independence and the quality of their analysis, the cost of their services and their relationship with corporate governance mechanisms. The present study investigates this topic in the Brazilian context. This has become possible following CVM Instruction No. 480, which obligates the disclosure of the costs of audit and non-audit services contracted to independent audit firms. The information provided by 131 companies in the first half of 2010 was analyzed to determine the relationship between corporate governance and audit and non-audit service costs. The proxies for governance that were used are given as follows: the five largest shareholders rights mismatch, the participation in premium listing segments of the Brazilian Securities, Commodities, and Futures Exchange (Bolsa de Mercadoria e Futuros e Bolsa de Valores de São Paulo -BM&FBovespa), the existence of an audit committee and an internal audit department. The results point to a negative relationship between governance and audit costs, which suggests that the risk effect is predominant in the Brazilian market; that is, better governance practices reduce external audit's risks (legal and loss of reputation), thereby allowing them to charge less. Most studies in the international literature show a positive relationship in favor of the demand effect, but this is not consensual. According to this effect, better governance implies greater demands on the audit service, resulting in an increase in the fees charged. The relationship between non-audit service costs and good governance practices is also negative. Although studies have not shown that these costs can contribute to the loss of independence of the external audit, legislators and regulators tend to limit this practice.

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Conflicts Of Interest And The Case Of Auditor Independence: Moral Seduction And Strategic Issue Cycling

Cited by 510 publications

References 89 publications

Avaliação do sistema de combate às fraudes corporativas no Brasil

Avaliação do sistema de combate às fraudes corporativas no Brasil

Internal corporate governance mechanisms and audit quality: Evidence from GCC region

Custos de auditoria e governança corporativa

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