Congressional Committe Behavior on Roll Call Votes: The U. S. House of Representatives, 1955-64

Dyson, James W.; Soule, John W.

doi:10.2307/2110356

Cited by 15 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…The 15 different types of committees responsible for the legislation in this study effectively screened sponsored legislation in each state through the 24-year period, although at an increasingly selective rate during the 1970s. Consistent with other research on committees (Dyson and Soule, 1970;Fenno, 1973;Lees and Shaw, 1979;Francis and Riddlesperger, 1982), and despite some expected performance differences, they behaved as active, consistent, and responsive legislative components in that they made it possible for each legislature to reduce large percentages of proposals before floor time was consumed.…”

Section: Committee Specializationsupporting

confidence: 81%

Sponsorship and Enactment

Browne

Ringquist

1985

American Politics Quarterly

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Patterns of legislation are examined over a 24-year period and legislative outcomes are traced through the policy process of four states: Florida, Iowa, Michigan, and New Jersey. The findings indicate that legislators are drawn in large numbers to sponsor age-related bills. Legislative committees do most of the work in reducing these proposals to the eventual 10% to 27% that will pass. Floor action overturns an average of 3 % of all sponsored bills and governors veto over 4%. Gubernatorial vetoes are especially high when committees report out unusually high percentages of bills and resolutions. There is only slight evidence of state legislators who, as specialists, have a sustained interest in sponsoring and passing age-related legislation.

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Section: Committee Specializationsupporting

confidence: 81%

Sponsorship and Enactment

Browne

Ringquist

1985

American Politics Quarterly

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“…See, for example, Austen-Smith and Riker (1987) for a voting game with private information, and Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987) for a committee-parent chamber game with asymmetric information and endogenous choice of procedures. 5 These include case studies and comparative studies using interview techniques (e.g., Fenno, 1966Fenno, , 1973, studies based on analysis of congressional data (e.g., Bach, 1985; Dyson and Soule, 1970;Smith, 1986), one study based on analysis of stock market data (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1986) and several books containing a variety of techniques (e.g., Fenno, 1966;Smith and Deering, 1984).…”

Section: Explanations and Problems Of Inferencementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Conversely, a strong committee might be more willing to confront amendments. Dyson and Soule (1970) try to avoid this problem by counting only amendments that pass over the opposition of a majority of committee members, but this does not escape another problem. Amendments may be either major or minor, or either close to or far from the committee median.…”

Section: Explanations and Problems Of Inferencementioning

confidence: 99%

The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage

Krehbiel¹,

Rivers²

1988

American Journal of Political Science

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“…Committees, and even subcommittees, have been portrayed as the nominal source of legislative expertise and specialization in national government (Dyson and Soule, 1970;Fenno, 1973;Ferejohn, 1974;Fiorino, 1977;Shepsle, 1978;Dodd and Schott, 1979;Lees and Shaw, 1979). Although Francis and Riddlesperger (1982) found that committees have come to play a central role in state legislatures, they have been seen as somewhat weaker at this level of government (Rosenthal, 1974;Uslaner and Weber, 1977;Hamm, 1980;Basehart, 1980).…”

Section: Subsystem Variablesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policymaking in the American States

Browne

1987

American Politics Quarterly

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This article examines the policymaking roles and interactions of governors, legislators, administrators, and lobbyists in state politics. It analyzes their policy involvement in terms of whether they fit a conceptual model of subsystem politics. These data are compared to various policy outcome measures of four state governments in the issue area of aging; Florida, Iowa, Michigan, and New Jersey. While the policy data from some states is suggestive of those results postulated in subsystem theory, the patterns of institutional involvement and interaction vary widely. All, however, suggest more clustered, rather than encompassing, patterns of influence and participation within this policy area.Research on the &dquo;neglected world&dquo; of state politics (Jewell, 1982) suffers from, among other things, a lack of attention to institutional relationships. As a result, political scientists know very little about the relative influence of various state-level political participants on policy outcomes. This study examines how relationships between policymakers, each carrying out their own institutional responsibilities, have been structured.The analysis takes a subsystem, or subgovernment, approach in that its intent is to determine the degree to which policyrelevant interaction is either restrictively clustered or generally open to an expanding number of participants. Subsystem expla-Aurhors Note: This study owes a great deal to Laurily Keir Epstein who collaborated on data gathering and the initial drafts of this article and other project papers. Thanks go to her and Myrna Froning, who helped gather the Iowa data. I am also indebted to

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Congressional Committe Behavior on Roll Call Votes: The U. S. House of Representatives, 1955-64

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

Sponsorship and Enactment

Sponsorship and Enactment

The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage

Policymaking in the American States

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