Conjunction Conditionalization and Irrelevant Semifactuals

Abstract

Are counterfactuals with true antecedents and consequents trivially true? The principle of Conjunction Conditionalization ((A∧C)→(A>C)) is highly controversial. Many philosophers view it as an attractive feature of Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals that it can easily be modified to avoid this principle. However, Walters and Williams (2013) beg to differ. They argue that Conjunction Conditionalization is an indispensable ingredient of any Lewisian semantics, since CC is entailed by standard Lewisian theorems and a plausible semantic claim about irrelevant semifactuals. If this is true, the entire tradition of revisionist counterfactual semantics is misguided, and so are many philosophical theories in which counterfactuals play a role. We argue, in defense of the revisionist tradition, that Walters and Williams' ‘plausible semantic claim’ is in fact anything but plausible. It turns out to entail semantic principles far more controversial than Conjunction Conditionalization.

Focused true–true counterfactuals

“… 5 5 This is controversial. An objection is found in Gundersen and Gundersen (2018), where they argue that this semantic assumption is not acceptable to those who think that the truth of a counterfactual requires some sort of connection between the antecedent and the consequent. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pointing that out. …”

Counterfactuals and double prevention

“…8 8 See, for example, Gundersen and Gundersen (2018), who argue against the principle that semi‐factuals with irrelevant antecedents are true, viz. that for any A that actually obtains, if B is irrelevant to A , then B □ → A (for some sense of ‘relevant’ to be specified).…”