Connecting Concepts to Each Other and the World

Goldstone, Robert L.; Feng, Yan; Rogosky, Brian J.

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511499968.012

Cited by 22 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 66 publications

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“…Computers do not have bodies, but there is reason to believe that it might be possible to model embodiment so as to integrate perceptual and action‐based representations with the symbolic representations studied here. Promising beginnings in that respect have already been made by various researchers, such as Goldstone, Feng, and Rogosky (2005) and Andrews, Vigliocco, and Vinson (2009).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Construction of Meaning

Kintsch¹,

Mangalath²

2010

Topics in Cognitive Science

141

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We argue that word meanings are not stored in a mental lexicon but are generated in the context of working memory from long-term memory traces that record our experience with words. Current statistical models of semantics, such as latent semantic analysis and the Topic model, describe what is stored in long-term memory. The CI-2 model describes how this information is used to construct sentence meanings. This model is a dual-memory model, in that it distinguishes between a gist level and an explicit level. It also incorporates syntactic information about how words are used, derived from dependency grammar. The construction of meaning is conceptualized as feature sampling from the explicit memory traces, with the constraint that the sampling must be contextually relevant both semantically and syntactically. Semantic relevance is achieved by sampling topically relevant features; local syntactic constraints as expressed by dependency relations ensure syntactic relevance.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Construction of Meaning

Kintsch¹,

Mangalath²

2010

Topics in Cognitive Science

141

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“…Clark and Chalmers (, p. 7) asked, “Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?” Their question is answered within this body of research as follows: the embodied mind includes the body (Lakoff & Johnson, ; Bechara, ; Allman, Hakeem, Erwin, Nimchinsky, & Hof, ; Varela et al., ; Carlson & Kenny, ; Gibbs, , , ), the environment/technology (Borghi, ; Goldstone, Feng, & Rogosky, ; Black et al., ; Hollan & Hutchins, ; Clark, ), and social history (MacWhinney, ; Zwaan & Madden, ).…”

Section: Themes Of Embodied Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition to the physical body, the embodied mind includes the environment and tools. As a number of studies have suggested (Black et al., ; Borghi, ; Clark, ; Clark & Chalmers, ; Goldstone et al., ; Hollan & Hutchins, ; Kirsh & Maglio, ; Wilson, ) both the naturally occurring environment and physical tools can be seen as enabling cognitive resources. Because the environment tends to have a reliable presence as it is physically sensed, studies have suggested that a person's cognitive function capacities evolve in ways that rely on the environment for cognitive short‐cuts (via tools) and exploit the possibilities of the environment's reliability (Clark & Chalmers, ).…”

Section: Themes Of Embodied Cognitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Embodied Cognition, Representationalism, and Mechanism: A Review and Analysis

Spackman

Yanchar

2013

J Theory Soc Behav

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Embodied cognition has attracted significant attention within cognitive science and related fields in recent years. It is most noteworthy for its emphasis on the inextricable connection between mental functioning and embodied activity and thus for its departure from standard cognitive science's implicit commitment to the unembodied mind. This article offers a review of embodied cognition's recent empirical and theoretical contributions and suggests how this movement has moved beyond standard cognitive science. The article then clarifies important respects in which embodied cognition has not departed fundamentally from the standard view. A shared commitment to representationalism, and ultimately, mechanism, suggest that the standard and embodied cognition movements are more closely related than is commonly acknowledged. Arguments against representationalism and mechanism are reviewed and an alternative position that does not entail these conceptual undergirdings is offered.

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“…a tree is alive), can be useful for navigating semantic networks and realizing connections between distant concepts, which may aid in problem-solving or learning (Chi et al, 1981; Chi and Ohlsson, 2005). On the other hand, concrete knowledge about a concept, such as knowing how an object looks or feels, is helpful for communicating about the same concept by grounding the concept in people’s common sensorimotor experience (Goldstone et al, 2005). There is some evidence that basic-level concepts emphasize both concrete and abstract information, whereas the content of subordinate-level concepts tends to be concrete and superordinate-level concepts emphasize abstract content (Rosch et al, 1976; Tversky & Hemenway, 1984).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A brain-based account of “basic-level” concepts

Bauer

Just

2017

NeuroImage

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This study provides a brain-based account of how object concepts at an intermediate (basic) level of specificity are represented, offering an enriched view of what it means for a concept to be a basic-level concept, a research topic pioneered by Rosch and others (Rosch et al., 1976). Applying machine learning techniques to fMRI data, it was possible to determine the semantic content encoded in the neural representations of object concepts at basic and subordinate levels of abstraction. The representation of basic-level concepts (e.g. bird) was spatially broad, encompassing sensorimotor brain areas that encode concrete object properties, and also language and heteromodal integrative areas that encode abstract semantic content. The representation of subordinate-level concepts (robin) was less widely distributed, concentrated in perceptual areas that underlie concrete content. Furthermore, basic-level concepts were representative of their subordinates in that they were neurally similar to their typical but not atypical subordinates (bird was neurally similar to robin but not woodpecker). The findings provide a brain-based account of the advantages that basic-level concepts enjoy in everyday life over subordinate-level concepts: the basic level is a broad topographical representation that encompasses both concrete and abstract semantic content, reflecting the multifaceted yet intuitive meaning of basic-level concepts.

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Connecting Concepts to Each Other and the World

Cited by 22 publications

References 66 publications

The Construction of Meaning

The Construction of Meaning

Embodied Cognition, Representationalism, and Mechanism: A Review and Analysis

A brain-based account of “basic-level” concepts

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