Conscience: The dos and don’ts of moral regulation.

Janoff‐Bulman, Ronnie

doi:10.1037/13091-007

Cited by 16 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 83 publications

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“…Following anthropology and cultural psychology research (Fiske, 1992; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Shweder & Sullivan, 1993), we adopt a descriptive view describing morality as interlocking “values, virtues, norms, practices, identities, institutions, technologies, and evolved psychological mechanisms that work together to suppress or regulate self-interest and make cooperative societies possible” (Haidt, 2012, p. 27). Moral standards and actions are related to not only justice, rights, and human welfare, but also sexual behavior, cleanliness, loyalty, and many other issues (Haidt & Joseph, 2004; Janoff-Bulman, 2011). Accordingly, moral people overcome self-interests to “conform to the established practices and customs” of their groups (Weiss, 1942, p. 381).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does virtue lead to status? Testing the moral virtue theory of status attainment.

Bai¹,

Ho²,

Yan

2020

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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The authors perform one of the first empirical tests of the moral virtue theory of status attainment (MVT), a conceptual framework for showing that morality leads to status. Studies 1a to 1d are devoted to developing and validating a 15-item status attainment scale (SAS) to measure how virtue leads to admiration (virtue–admiration), how dominance leads to fear (dominance–fear), and how competence leads to respect (competence–respect). Studies 2a and 2b are an exploration of the nomological network and discriminant validity to show that peer-reported virtue–admiration is positively related to moral character and perceptions such as perceived warmth and unrelated to amoral constructs such as neuroticism. In addition, virtue–admiration mediates the positive effect of several self-reported moral character traits, such as moral identity-internalization, on status conferral. Study 3 supports the external validity of the virtue route to status in a sample of fulltime managers from China. In Study 4, a preregistered experiment, virtue evokes superior status while selfishness evokes inferior status. Perceivers who are high in moral character show stronger perceptions of superior status. Finally, Study 5, another preregistered experiment, shows that virtue leads to higher status through inducing virtue–admiration rather than competence–respect, even for incompetent actors. The findings provide initial support for MVT arguing that virtue is a distinct, third route to status.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does virtue lead to status? Testing the moral virtue theory of status attainment.

Bai¹,

Ho²,

Yan

2020

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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“…In addition, virtue is based on a prescriptive system of moral regulation that focuses on approach motives to do something good, in comparison to conformity or guilt-proneness seemingly rooted in a proscriptive system of moral regulation that focuses on avoidance motives not to do something “bad” (Janoff-Bulman, 2011; Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009). There may be a tipping point above which moral characteristics or acts become seen as virtuous.…”

Section: The Moral Virtue Theory Of Status Attainmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Beyond Dominance and Competence: A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment

Bai

2016

Pers Soc Psychol Rev

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Recognition has grown that moral behavior (e.g., generosity) plays a role in status attainment, yet it remains unclear how, why, and when demonstrating moral characteristics enhances status. Drawing on philosophy, anthropology, psychology, and organizational behavior, I critically review a third route to attaining status: virtue, and propose a moral virtue theory of status attainment to provide a generalized account of the role of morality in status attainment. The moral virtue theory posits that acts of virtue elicit feelings of warmth and admiration (for virtue), and willing deference, toward the virtuous actor. I further consider how the scope and priority of moralities and virtues endorsed by a moral community are bound by culture and social class to affect which moral characteristics enhance status. I end by outlining an agenda for future research into the role of virtue in status attainment.

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“…For example, failures in self ‐restraint or self ‐control (e.g., body‐related transgressions including excessive eating, spending, gambling) typically elicit shame, whereas failures to be prosocial (e.g., failures to help or to care for others) often lead to guilt (Sheikh & Janoff‐Bulman, ). Thus, research on guilt and shame (as well as anger and disgust) may reveal links between the HOPS model and models of moral cognition that highlight both an approach/avoid (i.e., prescriptive/proscriptive) dimension as well as a self/other dimension (Janoff‐Bulman, Sheikh, & Hepp, 2009; Janoff‐Bulman, ). Although here we focus on the proscriptive aspects of our model – avoiding harming others and avoiding defiling the self – future exploration should target other areas of this multi‐dimensional space.…”

Section: Distinct Moral Norms For You and Mementioning

confidence: 99%

When Mental States Matter, When They Don't, and What That Means for Morality

Young

Tsoi

2013

Social & Personality Psych

107

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Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.

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Conscience: The dos and don’ts of moral regulation.

Cited by 16 publications

References 83 publications

Does virtue lead to status? Testing the moral virtue theory of status attainment.

Does virtue lead to status? Testing the moral virtue theory of status attainment.

Beyond Dominance and Competence: A Moral Virtue Theory of Status Attainment

When Mental States Matter, When They Don't, and What That Means for Morality

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