Consciousness: a neural capacity for objectivity, especially pronounced in humans

Abstract

Consciousness tends to be viewed either as subjective experience of sensations and feelings, or as perception and internal representation of objects. This paper argues that neither view sufficiently acknowledges that consciousness may refer to the brain’s most adaptive property: its capacity to produce states of objectivity. It is proposed that this capacity relies on multiple sensorimotor networks for internally representing objects and their properties in terms of expectancies, as well as on motivational and motor mechanisms involved in exploration, play, and care for vulnerable living and non-living objects. States of objectivity are associated with a very special phenomenal aspect; the experience that subjective aspects are absent and one is “just looking” at the world as it really is and can be. However, these states are normally closely preceded and followed by (and tend to be combined or fused with) sensations and feelings which are caused by activation of sensory and motivational mechanisms. A capacity for objectivity may have evolved in different species and can be conceived as a common basis for other elusive psychological properties such as intelligence, conscience, and esthetic experience; all three linked to crucial behaviors in human evolution such as tool making, cooperation, and art. The brain’s pervasive tendency to objectify may be responsible for wrongly equating consciousness with feelings and wrongly opposing it to well-learned or habitual (“unconscious”) patterns of perception and behavior.

Objectivity of human consciousness is a product of tool usage

“…The presented view agrees with that of Dijker' (2014) at the point that the ultimate source of objectivity is play. Play is a necessary predecessor of tool usage (Huizinga, 1950).…”

“…Dijker (2014) has recently proposed a novel approach to consciousness, according to which the primary function of consciousness is producing states of objectivity . States of objectivity are defined (p.2) as “internally represent[ing] objects and their dispositional properties … in relatively stable, accurate, increasingly complete, perceiver-independent ways, unbiased by specific needs, motives, and anticipation of instrumental aspects and rewards.” I think that the author has made a very import point, and that the principal objectivity of (some kind of) conscious states is a major issue unfortunately missed in most contemporary theories of consciousness.…”

“…However, I also think that the publication of Dijker (2014) is only a first step, and that the view of consciousness as the capacity to produce states of objectivity needs further development. I hope that the following comments can contribute to this development.…”

“…First of all, I would argue that although Dijker' (2014) approach is original, it has predecessors. Particularly, this was what Franz Brentano (Brentano, 2008; 1st Ed.…”

“…What is objective? Some aspects of Dijker' (2014) definition, such as accuracy and completeness, are difficult to test. Somebody must have standards of accuracy and completeness to determine in what degree my ideas of the world are accurate and complete.…”