Consciousness and complexity: Neurobiological naturalism and integrated information theory

Ellia, Francesco; Chis-Ciure, Robert

doi:10.1016/j.concog.2022.103281

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 44 publications

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“…It is important to highlight that the resulting metaphysical picture is wholly monistic, as claimed in [12,19,26]. In fact, it is a kind of radical monism according to which only subjective experiences truly exist as such; while the physical realm is either ontologically reduced to subjective experiences (Φ-structures and PSCs), or eliminated from existence (all non-conscious physical entities).…”

Section: The Ontological Reduction Of Physical Substrates Of Consciou...mentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Recall that the 0th and 1st phenomenal axioms state that consciousness exists intrinsically, for itself, and that this phenomenal existence is the only type of existence that is given immediately, beyond any doubt. Now, if consciousness exists intrinsically, and in a way that is selfevident and immediately known, then, according to IIT adherents, consciousness is "the fundamental, the ultimate" [19] (p. 21), something "ontologically basic, in the sense that it exists fundamentally" [26] (p. 5).…”

Section: Phenomenal Existence Is True Existence: Experience As Ontolo...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As mentioned in Section 2, Φ-structures are unfolded causal structures constituted by interrelated cause-effect powers that the mechanisms of a physical substrate exert intrinsically, i.e., within the system, in a specific, structured, and maximally irreducible way [11,12,20,23]. Also, notice that given that the physical is defined precisely in terms of causal power (IIT's principle of being), Φ-structures qualify as physical entities [11,12,26].…”

Section: The Ontological Reduction Of φ-Structures To Subjective Expe...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…At the same time, a Φ-structure ontologically reduces to its corresponding conscious experience (Section 3.3). Hence, ontologically speaking, there are only experiences; but from a third-person, physical perspective, experiences are operationalized in terms of cause-effect power as Φ-structures, which is how a physical substrate of consciousness (e.g., a conscious neural network) exists for itself, in physical terms [5,11,12,26]. In sum, while mereologically (maximally) irreducible (i.e., wholes that are maximally irreducible to their parts), PSCs ontologically reduce to their Φ-structures, which in turn, reduce to their corresponding consciousnesses.…”

Section: The Ontological Reduction Of Physical Substrates Of Consciou...mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0’s Realist Idealism

Cea,

Negro,

Signorelli

2023

Entropy

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Integrated Information Theory (IIT) is currently one of the most influential scientific theories of consciousness. Here, we focus specifically on a metaphysical aspect of the theory’s most recent version (IIT 4.0), what we may call its idealistic ontology, and its tension with a kind of realism about the external world that IIT also endorses. IIT 4.0 openly rejects the mainstream view that consciousness is generated by the brain, positing instead that consciousness is ontologically primary while the physical domain is just “operational”. However, this philosophical position is presently underdeveloped and is not rigorously formulated in IIT, potentially leading to many misinterpretations and undermining its overall explanatory power. In the present paper we aim to address this issue. We argue that IIT’s idealistic ontology should be understood as a specific combination of phenomenal primitivism, reductionism regarding Φ-structures and complexes, and eliminativism about non-conscious physical entities. Having clarified this, we then focus on the problematic tension between IIT’s idealistic ontology and its simultaneous endorsement of realism, according to which there is some kind of external reality independent of our minds. After refuting three potential solutions to this theoretical tension, we propose the most plausible alternative: understanding IIT’s realism as an assertion of the existence of other experiences beyond one’s own, what we call a non-solipsistic idealist realism. We end with concluding remarks and future research avenues.

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Section: The Ontological Reduction Of Physical Substrates Of Consciou...mentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Phenomenal Existence Is True Existence: Experience As Ontolo...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Ontological Reduction Of φ-Structures To Subjective Expe...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: The Ontological Reduction Of Physical Substrates Of Consciou...mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0’s Realist Idealism

Cea,

Negro,

Signorelli

2023

Entropy

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…What started as a search for neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) ( Crick and Koch, 1990 ) - for a discussion, see ( Chalmers, 2000 ) - has now matured to the development of a multitude of theories that aim to answer the more difficult question of how consciousness can be explained by the organization of brain processes ( Dehaene et al, 1998 ; Lamme, 2006 ; Tononi et al, 2016 ; Solms and Friston, 2018 ; Solms, 2019 ; Gidon et al, 2022 ; Seth and Bayne, 2022 ). These theories are subject to an intensive debate that involves experimental research ( Crick and Koch, 1998 ; Zeki and Bartels, 1998 ; Landman et al, 2003 ; Sligte et al, 2008 ; Aru et al, 2012 ; de Graaf et al, 2012 ; Liu et al, 2012 ; Bronfman et al, 2014 ; King and Dehaene, 2014 ; Mudrik et al, 2014 ; Noy et al, 2015 ; Josselyn and Tonegawa, 2020 ; He, 2023 ), philosophical analysis ( Block, 1995 , 2011 ; Chalmers, 1995 , 1996 ; Phillips, 2011 , 2016 ; Cohen et al, 2016 ; Usher et al, 2018 ; Bronfman et al, 2019 ; Ellia et al, 2021 ; Ellia and Chis-Ciure, 2022 ; Michel, 2023 ), as well as clinical/neuropsychological research ( Owen et al, 2006 ; Monti, 2015 ). These aspects of consciousness research are necessarily intertwined, because all the consciousness theories have specific philosophical starting points and implications.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions

Usher,

Negro,

Jacobson

et al. 2023

Front. Psychol.

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In this paper, we revisit the debate surrounding the Unfolding Argument (UA) against causal structure theories of consciousness (as well as the hard-criteria research program it prescribes), using it as a platform for discussing theoretical and methodological issues in consciousness research. Causal structure theories assert that consciousness depends on a particular causal structure of the brain. Our claim is that some of the assumptions fueling the UA are not warranted, and therefore we should reject the methodology for consciousness science that the UA prescribes. First, we briefly survey the most popular philosophical positions in consciousness science, namely physicalism and functionalism. We discuss the relations between these positions and the behaviorist methodology that the UA assumptions express, despite the contrary claim of its proponents. Second, we argue that the same reasoning that the UA applies against causal structure theories can be applied to functionalist approaches, thus proving too much and deeming as unscientific a whole range of (non-causal structure) theories. Since this is overly restrictive and fits poorly with common practice in cognitive neuroscience, we suggest that the reasoning of the UA must be flawed. Third, we assess its philosophical assumptions, which express a restrictive methodology, and conclude that there are reasons to reject them. Finally, we propose a more inclusive methodology for consciousness science, that includes neural, behavioral, and phenomenological evidence (provided by the first-person perspective) without which consciousness science could not even start. Then, we extend this discussion to the scope of consciousness science, and conclude that theories of consciousness should be tested and evaluated on humans, and not on systems considerably different from us. Rather than restricting the methodology of consciousness science, we should, at this point, restrict the range of systems upon which it is supposed to be built.

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Husserl’s concept of transcendental consciousness and the problem of AI consciousness

Orbik

2024

Phenom Cogn Sci

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Edmund Husserl, the founder of phenomenological philosophy, developed the concept of the so-called pure transcendental consciousness. The author of the article asks whether the concept of consciousness understood this way can constitute a model for AI consciousness. It should be remembered that transcendental consciousness is the result of the use of the phenomenological method, the essence of which is referring to experience (“back to things themselves”). Therefore, one can legitimately ask whether the consciousness that AI can achieve can possess the characteristics attributed by Husserl to pure transcendental consciousness. The answer to such questions seems to be negative because AI, as created by humans, can only operate in the field of phenomena. Human intelligence, however, is capable of operating at the ontological level. In the face of difficulties in understanding the phenomenon of consciousness on a scientific basis, the question arises about the possibility of using the phenomenological concept of consciousness developed by Husserl as a starting point in analyzes aimed at answering the question about AI consciousness (The aim of the article is not to discuss in detail the contemporary state of research on consciousness. Therefore, many results currently achieved mainly in the field of neuroscience are omitted. It is just about indicating the possible application of Husserl’s transcendental concept of consciousness in research on AI consciousness).

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Consciousness and complexity: Neurobiological naturalism and integrated information theory

Cited by 7 publications

References 44 publications

The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0’s Realist Idealism

The Fundamental Tension in Integrated Information Theory 4.0’s Realist Idealism

When philosophical nuance matters: safeguarding consciousness research from restrictive assumptions

Husserl’s concept of transcendental consciousness and the problem of AI consciousness

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