Consequentialist Motives for Punishment Signal Trustworthiness

Dhaliwal, Nathan A.; Skarlicki, Daniel P.; Hoegg, JoAndrea; Daniels, Michael

doi:10.1007/s10551-020-04664-5

Cited by 8 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 84 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…[12,19]); or (ii) by signalling cooperative intent, such that punishers benefit from increased access to cooperative interactions with new social partners (e.g. [11,15,17,20,21]). Here we focus on the latter possibility.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, the motives underpinning punishment decisions are hard to discern because punishment is, by definition, a harmful act. Punitive strategies could stem from spiteful motives, aimed at harming other people, or from fairness concerns and desires to uphold social norms of behaviour [7,20]. Punishment is, by definition, a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent than is helping, since helping others is less likely to stem from harmful or competitive motives.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Third-party punishment is thought to act as an honest signal of cooperative intent and such signals might escalate when competing to be chosen as a partner. Here, we investigate whether partner choice competition prompts escalating investment in third-party punishment. We also consider the case of signalling via helpful acts to provide a direct test of the relative strength of the two types of signals. Individuals invested more in third-party helping than third-party punishment and invested more in both signals when observed compared to when investments would be unseen. We found no clear effect of partner choice (over and above mere observation) on investments in either punishment or helping. Third-parties who invested more than a partner were preferentially chosen for a subsequent Trust Game although the preference to interact with the higher investor was more pronounced in the help than in the punishment condition. Third-parties who invested more were entrusted with more money and investments in third-party punishment or helping reliably signalled trustworthiness. Individuals who did not invest in third-party helping were more likely to be untrustworthy than those who did not invest in third-party punishment. This supports the conception of punishment as a more ambiguous signal of cooperative intent compared to help.

show abstract

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game

2022

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Both in real life (Dölling, Entorf, Hermann, & Rupp, 2009;Nagin, 2013;Dhaliwal et al, 2020;Tsai, 2021) and laboratory settings (Mulder, 2009;Verboon & van Dijke, 2011;Eriksson et al, 2017), the same punishment can lead to contrasting and even contradictory consequences in terms of changing others' beliefs about undesirability of the act, as well as the motivations and legitimacy of the authorities. Prior research has begun to shed light on these discrepant findings by characterizing how beliefs about authorities' motivations affect how people change their beliefs about wrongness of the act (Tyler, 2006;Mulder, 2009;Verboon & van Dijke, 2011), and vice versa (J.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Consequently, many studies have documented the positive perceptions that observers have of people who are willing to punish: in both economic games and vignette studies, third-parties who choose to punish are judged as more trustworthy and less selfish (J. J. Jordan & Rand, 2020), more competent and and more moral (Gordon, Madden, & Lea, 2014;Gordon & Lea, 2016;Dhaliwal, Skarlicki, Hoegg, & Daniels, 2020;de Kwaadsteniet, Kiyonari, Molenmaker, & van Dijk, 2019;J. Jordan & Kteily, 2020;Tsai, Trinh, & Liu, 2022), and are more likely to be chosen as cooperation partners than people who choose not to punish the same transgression.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

What people learn from punishment: joint inference of wrongness and punisher’s motivations from observation of punitive choices

Radkani

Saxe

2023

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Punishment is a cost imposed on a target, in response to an undesirable action. Yet choosing to punish also reveals information about the authority’s own motives and values. We propose that observers jointly infer the wrongness of the action and the authority’s motivations. Using hypothetical scenarios in unfamiliar societies, we experimentally manipulated observers’ prior beliefs and measured human observers’ inferences after observing punishment. These inferences were recapitulated in a formal model that inverts an intuitive causal model of authorities who make rational choices about punishment by weighing its costs and benefits (i.e. utilities). An essential component of this model, driving these inferences, is that legitimate authorities consider the utility of a proportional response to harmful actions, which depends on the balance between the wrongness of the act and the severity of the punishment.

show abstract

“…Po trzecie, musi istnieć system sankcjiw tym kary, jakie są wymierzane tym, których zachowania odbiegają od zaakceptowanych i zatwierdzonych norm społecznych. Karanie służy podtrzymywaniu norm współpracy 15 . Polega na zastosowaniu procedury, w której próbuje się zorientować zachowania jednostki na zaakceptowane w danej organizacji normy.…”

Section: Dyscyplina Pracy I Karaniedefinicje I Celeunclassified

Dyscyplina pracy w wybranych polskich organizacjach – problemy karania w opinii pracowników

Pokrzywa

2024

POLISPOL

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Celem artykułu jest ukazanie opinii pracowników wybranych polskich organizacji na temat dyscypliny, ze szczególnym uwzględnieniem problematyki karania. W artykule skoncentrowano się na opiniach badanych dotyczących częstotliwości karania, dominujących form karania, najczęstszych kar nieformalnych stosowanych w organizacjach zatrudniających badanych oraz emocji towarzyszących respondentom w sytuacji podlegania karze. Badania zrealizowano za pomocą techniki CAWI z 393 pracownikami reprezentującymi różne organizacje w Polsce. Respondenci deklarowali, że na ogół kary formalne stosowane są bardzo rzadko, jednak kary nieformalne występują w większości organizacji zatrudniających badanych. W wyniku stosowania kar następuje najczęściej spadek motywacji do pracy oraz brak satysfakcji z pracy. Karom towarzyszyło również poczucie niesprawiedliwości.

show abstract

Consequentialist Motives for Punishment Signal Trustworthiness

Cited by 8 publications

References 84 publications

Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game

Third-party punishers do not compete to be chosen as partners in an experimental game

What people learn from punishment: joint inference of wrongness and punisher’s motivations from observation of punitive choices

Dyscyplina pracy w wybranych polskich organizacjach – problemy karania w opinii pracowników

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About