Consociationalism and the politics of the census in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Northern Ireland

Cooley, Laurence

doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2020.102248

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…Since issues of common concern are as relevant for segmental parties and consociational legislatures as they are for executives catering to electorates in all segments, avoiding the view of cross‐segmental parties as a suboptimal alternative to the previously tried segmental representation is key to effective analysis of their success beyond the electoral metric. Naturally, their vote‐share rarely matches the demographic composition of the electorate dejected from ethnopolitical mobilisation, whether significantly surpassing the numbers of others in society, as in Bosnia (Zdeb, 2022); rising and falling during periods of political crises, as in North Macedonia (McEvoy, 2014); or remaining significantly lower than the percentage of the population declaring their dissociation from ethnopolitical segments in surveys, as in Northern Ireland (Cooley, 2020; Pow et al., 2020).…”

Section: ‘Seepage’ Of Cross‐segmental Concernsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Making Representative Politics Work: Cross‐Segmental Parties in Consociations

Agarin,

Jarrett

2023

Swiss Political Sci Review

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Cross‐segmental parties are outliers in consociations dominated by ethnic parties. While they often receive comparatively limited electoral support, they have the ability to make representative politics work. Cross‐segmental parties can successfully represent cross‐communal interests and encourage governments to focus on non‐segmental issues by bringing their ‘second policy dimension’ to the attention of segmental parties and encouraging ‘issue seepage’. To demonstrate this, we draw on evidence from these parties in cases including Northern Ireland, Belgium, Bosnia‐Herzegovina, Lebanon and South Tyrol, and argue that we need to look beyond election results to gauge their ‘success’. We identify three key areas – electoral dynamics, interactions in legislatures and contribution to government – where cross‐segmental, not segmental, parties can make representation work in consociations. This is true not only in liberal consociations that (can) explicitly accommodate cross‐segmental interests in legislative and executive arrangements but also in corporate consociations where formal accommodation does not exist.

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Section: ‘Seepage’ Of Cross‐segmental Concernsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Making Representative Politics Work: Cross‐Segmental Parties in Consociations

Agarin,

Jarrett

2023

Swiss Political Sci Review

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“…48 in Sejdić and Finci ), and therefore the geometric mean remains an available tool to make power‐sharing more functional in BiH. Second, post‐conflict demographic change is visible in the territorialization of ethnicity, which affects the “territorial aspects of census politics.” This change has determined the electoral rules in BiH on several occasions (Cooley, 2020: 7). The centripetal dimension of the geometric mean might be an integrative factor to overcome the territorialization of ethnicity, but also accommodate the political interests of the less numerous groups.…”

Section: The Bernese Jura Geometric Mean For the Election Of The Croa...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It should be noted that the 2013 population census was disputed, especially its methodology and data on "non-permanent residents"(Cooley, 2020;Hayden, 2020). Regardless, the census is used for official purposes in the FBiH.…”

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confidence: 99%

From Dayton to Bernese Jura: The Election of the Croat Member of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Pepić

Kasapović

2022

Swiss Political Sci Review

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After the signing of the Dayton Agreement, critical literature has attempted to portray consociation in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the predominant source of the country's political problems. At the same time, this literature has widely neglected the centripetal rules that have existed since the first elections of the tripartite Presidency. The paper analyzes the outcomes of the existing centripetal cross‐ethnic vote pooling rules. It concludes that such outcomes are negative and it then discusses a possible solution by drawing inspiration from the application of the Bernese Jura's geometric mean. The paper focuses on the election of the Croat member in the tripartite Presidency as representative of the least numerous ethnic group. We argue that the application of the geometric mean based upon results in Croat‐majority municipalities could eliminate certain grievances and weakens the chances for election of the Croat member by voters from dominantly Bosniak areas.

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