Conspiracy Theories are Not Beliefs

Abstract

Napolitano (The epistemology of fake news, Oxford University Press, 2021) argues that the Minimalist Account of conspiracy theories—i.e., which defines conspiracy theories as explanations, or theories, about conspiracies—should be rejected. Instead, she proposes to define conspiracy theories as a certain kind of belief—i.e., an evidentially self-insulated belief in a conspiracy. Napolitano argues that her account should be favored over the Minimalist Account based on two considerations: ordinary language intuitions and theoretical fruitfulness. I show how Napolitano’s account fails its own purposes with respect to these two considerations and so should not be favored over the Minimalist Account. Furthermore, I propose that the Minimalist Account is the best conception of ‘conspiracy theory’ if we share Napolitano’s goal of advancing the understanding of conspiracy theories.

Are Conspiracy Theory Believers Drawn to Conspiratorial Explanations, Alternatives Explanations, Or Both?

“…In this research, we sought to examine if conspiracy mentality consists of 1) an exclusive preference for conspiratorial explanations, 2) an exclusive preference for alternative explanations, or 3) a preference for conspiratorial explanations that are also rejected by authorities. These interpretations map onto different approaches to defining conspiracy theories: definitions that characterize conspiracy theories solely based on their conspiratorial content (i.e., "minimalist" definitions, Duetz, 2022), and more specific definitions that characterize conspiracy theories based on their conspiratorial content and their alternative status. Since most real-life conspiracy theories exhibit both a conspiratorial content and an alternative status (Räikkä, 2018), we experimentally manipulated the status (official vs. alternative) of competing conspiratorial and non-conspiratorial explanations of fictitious events to disentangle the respective roles of the two features.…”

“…A key difference lies in whether these definitions seek to distinguish conspiracy theories from other conspiracy claims (Nera & Schöpfer, 2023). Minimalist definitions (Duetz, 2022) characterize conspiracy theories solely based on their conspiratorial content. For instance, Keeley (1999) proposes to define a conspiracy theory as a "proposed explanation of some historical event (or events) in terms of the significant causal agency of a relatively small group of persons-the conspirators-acting in secret" (p. 116; for similar definitions, see Douglas et al, 2019;van Prooijen & van Lange, 2014;van Prooijen & van Vugt, 2018).…”

“…In this view, what characterizes a conspiracy theory is the fact that it involves a conspiracy-that is, a coordinated and ill intended secret operation (Zonis & Joseph, 1994). Such a "minimalist account" (Duetz, 2022) does not seek to identify what distinguishes conspiracy theories from other conspiracy claims. By such definitions, the claims that Julius Caesar was victim of a conspiracy in 44 B.C., or that Al Qaeda caused the 9/11 attacks, qualify as conspiracy theories (Nera & Schöpfer, 2023)-even though they are endorsed by epistemic authorities and therefore do not align with the common understanding of the expression (Räikkä, 2018).…”

What is so special about conspiracy theories? Conceptually distinguishing beliefs in conspiracy theories from conspiracy beliefs in psychological research

“…In the following, to distinguish what does and what does not count as a conspiracy theory, we rely on more elaborate definitions of conspiracy theories (e.g., Brotherton, 2013; Cassam, 2019; Guillon, 2018, see under heading “Addressing the false positive problem”), which themselves map onto the intuitive notion that conspiracy theories differ from other conspiracy claims. Since the distinction criteria are debated (e.g., Duetz, 2022; Napolitano, 2021; Uscinski & Enders, 2022), our rationale will rely on nonambiguous (i.e., prototypical) examples of conspiracy theories (e.g., about the Illuminati, flat Earth, 9/11; see Leveaux et al, 2022) and conspiracy claims that do not qualify as conspiracy theories (e.g., the claim that Al Qaeda caused the 9/11 attacks, that Julius Caesar was assassinated in 44 B.C.E., or that Hitler had his political opponents murdered in 1934).…”

What Is So Special About Conspiracy Theories? Conceptually Distinguishing Beliefs in Conspiracy Theories from Conspiracy Beliefs in Psychological Research

“…In the following, to distinguish what does and what does not count as a conspiracy theory, we rely on more elaborate definitions of conspiracy theories (e.g., Brotherton, 2013;Cassam, 2019;Guillon, 2018, see below), which themselves map onto the intuitive notion that conspiracy theories differ from other conspiracy claims. Since the distinction criteria are debated (e.g., Duetz, 2022;Napolitano, 2021;Uscinski & Enders, 2022), our rationale will rely on non-ambiguous (i.e., prototypical) examples of conspiracy theories (e.g., about the Illuminati, flat earth, 9/11, see Leveaux et al, 2022) and conspiracy claims that do not qualify as conspiracy theories (e.g., the claim that Al Qaeda caused the 9/11 attacks, that Julius Caesar was assassinated in 44 B.C., or that Hitler had his political opponents murdered in 1934).…”